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COMFORTABLE BED-FELLOWS? RUSSIA AND THE RADICAL 
RIGHT AFTER THE CRIMEAN ANNEXATION 
Liesa Aitton 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the radical rightist stances of the Alternative für Deutschland 
(AfD), the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), the Front National (FN), Jobbik 
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), the UK Independence Party (UKIP), and the 
Vlaams Belang (VB) on Russia in the light of the Ukrainian crisis, in particularly the 
Crimean crisis. A focus will be placed on the radical right’s foreign policy agenda, and 
how this shaped their perspective towards Russia. In the past, the scholarship in this 
field has mostly ignored this topic in favour of analysing the internal dimension. Over 
the last couple years, the field has expanded to include external factors, such as 
Euroscepticism and Russophilia. However, most research chose to heavily feature anti-
EU sentiments. Thus, questions regarding the relationship between Russia and the 
radical right remained unanswered. Through an analysis of party programs, voting 
patterns, and debates in the European Parliament, this thesis measures how and to what 
extend pro-Russian sentiments have manifested in the external dimension of the radical 
right. Additionally, patterns of pro-Russian and/or anti-Russian stances, are used to 
complement this analysis. Regardless of their attitude towards Russia, the findings 
suggest that the Russian Federation has recently started to appear on the radical right 
foreign policy agenda. In regard to the FN, the FPÖ, and Jobbik similar pragmatic and 
Eurosceptic arguments were brought forward to indicate a positive stance towards 
Russia. The VB supports some of these pragmatic principles as well, but generally 
perceives Russia in more neutral terms. Finally, those that are critical of the Russian 
Federation, primarily the AfD and UKIP, tend to use diverging reasons to support their 
view. As a consequence, patterns on radical right-Russia relations present a rather 
mixed perspective. 
  
Keywords: Radical right, Russia, Front National, Alternative für Deutschland, UK 
Independence Party, Vlaams Belang, Jobbik, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, 
Euroscepticism, European Union. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 At the end of 2013, the then President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, made the 
decision to cooperate with Russia, as opposed to signing the Association Agreement 
(AA) with the European Union (EU). Once this news reached the Ukrainian population, 
protests started to erupt throughout Kiev. The Ukrainian people collectively went to the 
Maidan and demanded that Yanukovych sign these agreements after all. No one cared 
that the AA would not provide solutions to all Ukraine’s problems, instead they wished 
to put a stop to Russia’s influence over their nation-state. Their demands were not met, 
in fact, the Ukrainian government called for the riot police to break up the protests. 
Overnight a large number of students were beaten and imprisoned. Yet, the 
demonstrators were not to be deterred, and continued to demand that the AA were 
signed, and at this point also called for the impeachment of Yanukovych. While the 
number of protestors steadily increased, so too did the number of violent altercations. In 
February 2014, fighting reached a peak and 79 people were killed over the course of 
one day (Bojcun, 2015). Shortly thereafter, Yanukovych realized that the situation in 
Ukraine was no longer manageable, and fled to Russia. However, this did not cause 
peace to return to Ukraine. In fact, unrest still affected the country, and this became 
particularly noticeable in Eastern Ukraine. So much so, that the Russian Federation 
came to believe that this state of social anxiety would negatively affect their own state 
and population if they did not intervene. As a consequence, the Russian leadership 
decided to seize Crimea and armed revanchist insurgencies in the Donbas and Luhansk 
regions (Bojcun, 2015, p.397). Finally, in March 2014 Crimea became de facto part of 
Russia. 
If one were to look into the situation in Ukraine right now, it would become 
apparent that violence has decreased. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian crisis still has not 
been resolved. Moreover, the situation will likely remain tense for the foreseeable future 
as both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community continue to level sanctions against one 
another. The EU, in particular, has adopted several measures against Russia these 
include, but are not limited to: economic sanctions; diplomatic measures; restrictions on 
economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol; and individual restrictive measures 
(European Council & Council of the European Union, n.d.). In response Russia has 
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issued counter-sanctions as well, but, maybe even more importantly, started a 
propaganda war. The output of propaganda served two main purposes. Firstly, it aimed 
to justify Russia’s behaviour in Crimea. Secondly, propaganda was used to find parties 
in Europe that could come to look favourably upon Russia. This with the purpose to 
undermine the Union, while also promoting Russia’s place in the global society. Slowly 
but surely radical right-wing parties came to be seen as ideal partners. After all, the 
radical right, like the Russian Federation, despised the EU as well as other Western 
institutions. Thus, through this propaganda war, Putin believed that he could kill two 
birds with one stone. He could legitimise the Crimean annexation and delegitimise the 
EU at the same time (Moreira, 2018).…………............………………………………….
This thesis will not be focussing on the Russian propaganda war, but instead will 
provide a discussion on how the radical right has reacted to the Russian Federation in 
light of the conflict in Ukraine, in particular in Crimea. Specifically, I will seek to 
determine what kind of relation the radical right has with Russia, and why this positive 
or negative connection came into being. I believe this research to be an important 
addition to the field, as most research focusses on the conceptualisation, vote and office 
seeking patterns, and internal dimension of the radical right (see for example Mudde, 
2007; Mudde, 2016; Minkenberg, 2017; Vasilopolou, 2009; Norris, 2005; Rush, 1963; 
Brack, 2015b). While these are inherently interesting topics, I feel like the radical and 
extreme right-wing scholarship has not fully committed to researching topics related to 
the external dimension, especially when it does not concern the EU. Thus, research on 
Russia-radical right relations appear to be lacking. That being said, recently some 
scholars such as Klapsis (2015), Larrabee et al. (2017), Polyakova et al. (2016), Mudde 
(2014), and Orestein (2014) have made a valiant effort to expand on the research 
already available in this scholarly field. Nevertheless, this clearly has not proven 
sufficient, as it remains unknown to what extent the radical right has engaged with the 
Russian Federation.  
In this thesis the author aims to focus on three different aspects that I believe to 
be under researched. Firstly, the author will discuss the extent to which pro-Russian 
sentiments have become part of the radical right’s foreign policy agenda. Secondly, a 
focus will be placed on how pro-Russian sentiments have manifested themselves. 
Finally, the author will analyse if the manifestation of these sentiments has led to any 
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distinguishable patterns, and, more importantly, how these can be explained. In order to 
answer these questions, party manifesto, European Parliamentary (EP) votes and 
debates between 2014 and 2018 will be examined through the scope of the qualitative 
and quantitative content analysis. 
My first chapter outlines the already existing theory on the radical right. A focus 
will be placed on their foreign policy interests as well as on the conceptualisation and 
terminology used in regards to this party family. In the second chapter the author will 
explain the methodology used in this study, and the problems that came along with it. 
The research questions included in this thesis will also be brought forward. My third 
chapter addresses the case studies, in particularly the author will analyse the radical 
right’s stances on the EU, immigration, and xenophobia. In the fourth chapter, the 
results will be presented based on an analysis of party programs, EP votes, 
parliamentary debates. These will be further highlighted and put into context in the fifth 
chapter. Finally, the author will close this study by presenting some conclusions on the 
radical right, its foreign policy perspectives, and its relation to the Russian Federation. 
Points for further research will also be included in this segment.  
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1. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
1.1 Definitions of Radical Right-Wing Parties 
 
Before embarking on the conceptualization of ‘radical right-wing parties’, it is 
important to note that both the terminology as well as the party family itself prove 
problematic. Issues concerning the latter became apparent as scholars and policy makers 
alike started to describe a party family which includes parties such as the Freiheitlichen 
Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Front National1 (FN). 
While all these parties may maintain some similarities, it has become clear that they 
prove tremendously diverse as well (Norris, 2005). As a result, it becomes debatable 
what qualities a party should maintain in order to be qualified as the radical right. 
Confusion further ensues as very few scholars focus on providing a clear and 
unambiguous definition on the radical right, yet continue to discuss parties which they 
believe to fall in a this ‘party family’ (Mudde, 2007). Besides causing conceptual 
problems, this has also lead to authors introducing a large plethora of terms when 
discussing these parties, including, but not limited to: extreme right, far right, radical 
right, radical right-wing populism, national populism, neo-populism, and ethno-
nationalism (Mudde, 2007). While research has improved over the years the debate on 
terminology and conceptualization continues.  
During the first wave of the radical right scholarship, which lasted from 1945 
until 1980, scholars such as G.B. Rush aimed to develop a working definition of this 
party family (Mudde, 2016; Rush, 1963). This scholar mainly argued that ideologies 
promoted by American radical right-wing parties focussed on four headings: negative 
attitudes regarding the government, international relations, modern social principles, 
and modern social structure and operation (with the exception of the right to work and 
free enterprise which these parties would support) (Rush, 1963). Even though this 
definition may have worked in the 1960s in the United States, it appears lacking when 
current radical right-wing parties are discussed. Especially his arguments on social 
principles and social structures seem problematic, as parties such as the FN and Vlaams 
                                                
1 The Front National recently indicated that they are planning to change their name into Rassemblement 
National. This thesis will continue to use Front National and its abbreviation FN, as this change has not 
been finalised yet (Vermaas, 2018).  
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Belang (VB) are known for supporting welfare chauvinism (Front National, 2017; 
Vlaams Belang, 2014). Meaning that these parties can be in support of a welfare state, 
as long as the native inhabitants of the nation-state are the only ones benefitting. 
Moreover, while social structures and the economy are certainly taken into account, it 
cannot be said that these are the most important ideological features of this party family 
(Mudde, 2007). So while Rush’s conceptualization certainly added to the research 
already available in the field, and might have even worked in a certain time and space, it 
will not be used in this thesis. 
Several decades later, Hans-Georg Betz published his renowned book ‘Radical 
Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe’ (1994). In his first chapter some attention is 
given to the definition of, as he terms it, the radical right. Betz argued that radical right-
wing parties are (1) against individual and social equality, (2) opposed to the integration 
of marginalized groups and (3) tend to be xenophobic, and can be racist and/or anti-
Semitist (1994, p.4). Moreover, these parties are also able to portray populist tendencies 
(Betz, 1994). Even though this description provides some good characteristics of radical 
right-wing parties, little detail is provided on how Betz himself interprets characteristics 
such as social equality, populism, and marginalized groups. For example, Betz does not 
indicate how and for what reason people can become marginalized. Furthermore, he 
also does not distinguish between those groupings that are marginalized because they 
are foreign entities, and those groups that get the same hostile treatment but originated 
from the state. Clearly Betz does not take these as well as several other issues into 
account, as a consequence the quality of his conceptualization suffered. That being said, 
I do appreciate that Betz uses the term ‘radical right’ as opposed to ‘extreme right’. This 
because the former term can be interpreted as being opposed to constitutional and/or 
liberal democracy, whereas the latter can be construed as the “antithesis of democracy” 
(Mudde, 2010, p.1168). I personally prefer the first term, as most far right parties do not 
necessarily appear to be anti-democratic, but rather find the manner through which 
modern states construe democracy to be problematic. 
More recently, Michael Minkenberg added to the field of radical right-wing 
politics and its definitions. Although Minkenberg acknowledges that a vast body of 
literature is available on the subject, very few scholars have taken the Eastern European 
system into account (2017). He feels this to be rather disappointing, as Eastern radical 
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right-wing parties are distinct from those in the West. Especially considering that 
Eastern European radical right parties are known to be more prone to violence, are more 
anti-democratic, and are characterized by their tendency to closely resemble social 
movements (Minkenberg, 2017). Consequently, Minkenberg aimed to present a 
conceptualization that takes both the Eastern and Western situation into consideration. 
In the end the author came to the conclusion that the radical right is best defined as:  
“ideological criteria of a populist and romantic ultranationalism, a myth of a 
homogenous nation which puts the latter before the individual and his or her civil 
rights and which therefore is directed against liberal and pluralist democracy 
(through not necessarily in favour of a fascist state), its underlying values of 
freedom and equality, and the related categories of individualism and universalism” 
(Minkenberg, 2017, p.14). 
In this definition the nation as well as its ethnic, cultural, and/or religious inhabitants 
play a central role (Minkenberg, 2017). As a result, a clear distinction is being made 
between those belonging to the in-group and those being the out-group. This idea ties in 
well with Mudde’s (2007) theory on nativism, which will be discussed in further 
paragraphs. Additionally, Minkenberg (2017) emphasizes the role of democratic 
principles. Most radical right parties appeared rather critical towards the democratic 
order, yet do not wish to completely eradicate the system. Instead, they aim to instigate 
a true government by and for ‘the people’. This conceptualization, unlike those 
presented in earlier decades, seems to take the reality of the radical right in Eastern and 
Western Europe into account. Nevertheless, I believe that the Mudde’s definition, which 
will be analysed next, represents a more structural explanation of the phenomenon 
under discussion.   
Finally, the conceptualization by Cas Mudde (2007) will be discussed. Besides 
being one of the most renowned scholars in the field, his definition is also well received 
among other scholars. Mudde provides both a minimum and a maximum 
conceptualization. The former defines the party family according to the ‘lowest 
common denominator’, so the feature or features that all parties in the radical right 
family have in common. The maximum definition discusses the ‘greatest common 
denominator’, meaning that those factors that make these parties analogous will be 
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taken into account (Mudde, 2007). The former will be discussed first, followed by an 
analysis of the latter.  
Mudde (2007) argues that nativism can be perceived as the minimal definition as 
it is able to accommodate all parties. Nativism is best described “an ideology, which 
holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the 
nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening 
to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007, p.19). This term appears better suited 
then those more commonly used, such as nationalism. Because, nativism excludes the 
possibility of liberal or soft nationalism. Moreover, nativism also acknowledges the 
importance of xenophobia, which Betz (1994) already described in the early 1990s.  
The nativist ideology is also included in Mudde’s maximum definition, which 
additionally contains authoritarianism and populism (2007). The first can be perceived 
differently through various disciplines, but in this case the author was inspired by the 
Frankfurt School and scholars from the social psychology field such as Adorno et al. 
(1950). These scholars conceptualized authoritarianism as “a general disposition to 
glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical towards authoritative figures of the 
ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral 
authority” (Adorno et al., 1950, p.228). While this manner of thinking definitely aided 
Mudde in his work, he believed that too many ideological features related to anti-
Semitism and ethnocentrism were included. Instead, he wished authoritarianism to 
relate to principles of law and order and punitive conventional moralism (Mudde, 2007, 
p.22-23). Finally, Mudde, like Betz, includes populism in his maximum definition. Here 
populism can be described as a thin-centred ideology which establishes a divide 
between the people and the elite. In this case the will of the people (‘volonté générale’) 
should always precede over the wishes of the corrupt elite. In this thesis the maximum 
definition will be used, as I believe that the greatest common denominator best 
represents the case studies which will discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2 What Makes the Radical Right Different? 
 
When the radical right came into being in the late 1940s and early 1950s, people 
quickly realised that this party family was not like the others. In fact, their extremist 
ideologies made it impossible for them to be represented in mainstream political parties, 
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such as the Socialist, Social Democrats, Labour, Liberal, Christian Democrats, and 
Conservative parties (Adams et al., 2006). Consequently, the radical right, like the 
Green party in the 1970s, became known as niche parties (Meguid, 2005). While this 
title has become generally accepted by the scholarship in this field, a definition of what 
it means to be a ‘niche party’ still has not been found. Nevertheless, scholars such as 
Meguid (2005), Adams et al. (2006), and Wagner (2011) have made valiant efforts to 
resolve this problem.  
 The most general conceptualization is presented by Adams et al. (2006, p.513), 
who believe that a niche party presents either a non-centrist ‘niche’ ideology or simply 
has an extreme ideology. Although this definition may have worked in their research 
project, it appears too vague. Moreover, it does not truly indicate why the far-right, or 
any other niche party, is perceived as inherently different. A more complex 
conceptualization is provided by Meguid (2005). Firstly, she argues that niche parties 
prioritize issues that are outside of traditional politics. Secondly, the issues that are 
raised by niche parties rarely coincide with the left-right-centre political division 
maintained by mainstream parties. Finallyy, these parties only adopt policy positions on 
a limited set of topics, and could consequently become single-issue parties (Meguid, 
2005, p.348; Wagner, 2011, p.846). While I believe that this conceptualization has more 
potential than Adam et al.’s (2006), it still has some problematic aspects. The most 
important being, that Meguid (2005) continuously appears to refer to niche parties as 
new parties. Yet this would imply that parties such as the FN and FPÖ could not be 
perceived as niche parties, even though they do satisfy all other criteria.  
Finally, Wagner’s (2011) definition will be discussed. This scholar 
acknowledges the work of both Adams et al.’s (2006) and Meguid (2005). Wagner, like 
me, appeared most impressed with the latter’s conceptualization, yet found some issues 
as well. Nevertheless, by simplifying Meguid’s (2005) definition, Wagner was able to 
come to the conclusion that niche parties are best defined as parties that “(a) do not 
emphasize economic issues and (b) emphasize a narrow range of non-economic issues” 
(Wagner, 2011, p.847). It is important to note that a party can only be qualified as a 
‘niche party’ if it satisfies both conditions. I believe this conceptualization to be most 
beneficial to my thesis, as one would only have to analyse a party’s ideology and/or 
manifesto in order to determine whether or not it is a niche party. Moreover, this 
 15 
definition is flexible enough that the party’s age does not need to be taken into account. 
Besides that, it also acknowledges that a niche party could mainstream and/or radicalise.  
It should be noted that the non-economic issues mentioned by Wagner (2011) 
could be anything. In the next few paragraphs, some of the more common policy issues 
amongst radical right-wing parties will be discussed. Mudde (2007, p.63-89) first points 
towards identity politics. In the case of radical right parties these are inherently tied to 
nativist and populist ideologies, and focusses on the us vs them dichotomy. Individuals 
or groups not belonging to the in-group are described in great detail in order to create a 
good understanding of who is and who is not the enemy. Among European radical 
right-wing parties, immigrants are perceived as the biggest enemy. Depending on the 
region or nation-state, prejudices may increase if the immigrant belongs to Jewish, 
Muslim, and/or Roma communities (Mudde, 2007, p.78). Regardless of one’s (cultural 
and/or religious) identity, those considered outside of the state will always be 
considered as enemies as they are not native to the nation. However, it is also possible 
to become an anti-figure if you are inside the state, but not part of the nation (Mudde, 
2007). 
Given the predominantly nativist position of the radical right, it cannot come as 
a surprise that they despise outside influences, especially when it is (forcefully) imposed 
on them through institutes such as the EU (Mudde, 2007; Brack & Startin, 2015). 
However, this hatred has not always been the norm. In fact, until the late 1980s most 
radical right parties supported further European integration. Yet, this all changed after 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which took competences from the states and instead gave 
these to the Union (Brack & Startin, 2015). As a consequence, most radical right-wing 
parties became either Eurorejects or Eurosceptics. Nevertheless, some parties and/or 
party leaders note that they remain pro-Europe. This is best seen in the case of the FN, 
which used slogans such as “NO to Maastricht – yes to a Europe of Fatherlands!” 
(Mudde, 2007, p.165). This sentiment may appear logical to these niche parties, as most 
European states share some common aspects such as a (Judeo-Christian) history, 
culture, and/or religion. Besides that, some states may even positively look upon some 
form of cooperation, as long as it is mutually beneficial (Mudde, 2007). EU integration, 
however, is not perceived this way. Rather, it is believed that the EU is infringing on the 
sovereignty of states (Brack & Startin, 2015). After all, states are no longer the sole 
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agents that get to determine where their borders are, who gets citizenship, and who gets 
to immigrate into their state. As a result, several parties, most notably the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), have made strong efforts to leave the EU. 
Other issues such as globalisation, Islamism, democracy and feminism are also 
not popular among the radical right. Thus, it could be said that Wagner’s (2011) non-
economic issues could be anything, yet most tend to fall within the nativist, populist, 
and/or authoritarian spectrum that Mudde (2007) described. Nevertheless, these parties 
have come to realisation that they have to present a well-rounded policy agenda if they 
wish for popular support on the local, national, and EU level. Consequently, the radical 
right has started to introduce policies on welfare, culture, education, the environment, 
safety, and also on the economy. This last point seems to contradict Wagner’s (2011, 
p.847) argument, that radical right-wing parties would not emphasize the economy. Yet, 
according to Mudde this trend does not have to undermine Wagner’s theory. Even 
though some parties have come to support a neoliberal economic system, this tends to 
be a secondary part of their ideology (Mudde, 2007, p.119). Thus, this aspect is mostly 
added with the purpose to please the electorate, and not because the radical right 
actually feels strongly about the economy.  
 
1.3 Anti-EU and/or Pro-Russia 
 
 It has been noted before that most radical right-wing parties tend to focus on a 
certain range of issues that mostly link to their nativist, populist, and authoritarian 
ideology. Moreover, while most of these parties can no longer be qualified as single-
issue parties, most still pay more attention to their internal sphere then to their external 
dimension. This for the logical reason that they wish to attract support from the in-
group, and leave the out-group where it is, outside of the nation. Nevertheless, over time 
these parties have come to the conclusion that some attention to their foreign policy 
sphere has become a necessity. Thus, in the 1990s, most, if not all, radical parties 
became critical of the EU. While some parties can only claim to be Eurosceptic, others 
have turned downright hostile towards this organisation. Especially those in the latter 
category, such as UKIP, became known for their single-issue foreign policy, that of 
being anti-EU. These anti-EU sentiments are best seen through quotes by radical-
leaders, such as Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who claimed that: “We have always 
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been told that the EU stands for peace. But […] now we know better. The EU stands for 
warmongering2” (Wilders, 2014, n.p.). Although Wilders’ anti-EU sentiments 
specifically focus on the EU’s war-like tendencies, other leaders and parties have come 
to denounce the EU as it continues to bolster an expansionist rhetoric. Besides that, the 
radical right also denounces the idea that the EU should integrate more, as this would 
imply that the nation-state would have to transfer even more sovereignty to this 
supranational entity (Klapsis, 2015, p.25).  
 Over time, some radical right-wing parties have also started to include criticism 
towards other Euro-Atlantic institutions in their foreign policy directives. These 
institutes, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), are perceived 
negatively, as the radical right believes that they are losing their independence and 
sovereignty to them. Thus, some, but not all, parties started to argue that all their 
problems (both internal and external) could be resolved if these Euro-Atlantic 
institutions simply ceased to exist. However, most radical right parties remain rather 
marginal on both the national and EU level. Thus, it remains unlikely that institutes 
such as the EU and/or NATO will just dissolve. Furthermore, not all parties may have 
the ability to instigate a national version of ‘Brexit’. That being said, the radical right 
may still include critical statements on international alliances in their party manifestos 
and/or speeches.  
 Criticism towards the West hardly ever resulted in change. Consequently, some 
radical right-wing parties thought that it might prove beneficial to start looking towards 
the East, and it appears like they found a natural ally in the Russian Federation (Rohac, 
Zgut & Györi, 2017). The first pro-Russian sentiments became apparent in the late 
2000s in states such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary (Political Capital, 2014). These 
were all countries that had had strong relations with Russia during the Soviet regime. 
Because of the annexation of Crimea and the Brexit talks, parties from the West also 
stared to see the appeal in having Russia as a potential partner. (Rohac, Zgut & Györi, 
2017, p.13). This due to the fact that Russia was as hostile towards the EU and NATO 
as the radical right. Consequently, Russia started to appear like a good geopolitical 
alternative. This in particularly, since Russia’s disruptive behaviour may be able to 
                                                
2 Translated from Dutch: “Ons is altijd verteld dat de EU voor vrede staat. Maar […] weten we wel beter. 
De EU staat voor Oorlogshitsing”. 
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facilitate the dissolution of the EU, and may therefore be able to completely (re)shape 
the post-EU era (Klapsis, 2015). Moreover, “many European far-right politicians see in 
Russia and example of how a country can be truly sovereign and independent, ignoring 
Western liberalism and confronting the West” (Klapsis, 2015, p.25). Thus, due to these 
believes the radical right appears to have shifted it foreign policy from the EU to 
Russia. The Kremlin actively seems to welcome this move, as Russia stands to gain 
from this as well, since this enables them to overtly and covertly use the radical right to 
“destabilize European governments, prevent EU expansion, and help bring to power 
European governments that are friendly to Russia” (Orestein, 2014, p.2). 
 Historic relations also play a large role in shaping the foreign policy of the 
radical right. Polyakova et al. (2016, p.4) argue that this proves the case in states such as 
Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and France. In particularly, France and Germany 
have had a long history of strong economic as well as political relations with Russia. 
Thus, it seems likely that the radical right is especially hesitant to ruin these connections 
by imposing sanctions in responds to the Ukrainian crisis. However, after flight MH-17 
got shot down, all states united themselves behind Merkel and agreed that restrictive 
measures were necessary. The radical right did not agree with these measures, yet were 
not powerful enough to prevent them. Nevertheless, the radical right as well as big 
businesses in the defence and energy sector stand to benefit from improved relations 
with Russia, and will thus act accordingly (Polyakova et al., 2016).  
 Finally, Eurosceptical and Euroreject parties may have established closer 
relations with Russia due to an ideological connection. This ideological angle has come 
into play somewhat more recently, and is a direct result of Vladimir Putin’s re-election. 
When Putin came back to power in 2012, he actively started to promote a neo-
conservative perspective at home and abroad. The Kremlin focussed on this specific 
angle as they believe it to be beneficial for both Russia and the European states to return 
to the “Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation” (Klapsis, 2015, 
p.17). In doing so, a focus was placed on the nation, its native culture, and religion. 
Few, if any, radical right parties would disagree with these ideas as they basically 
represent their core values. Some politicians, such as Gábor Vona, Marine Le Pen, and 
Aymeric Chauprade, would go even further and claim that Russia should be perceived 
as a ‘model society’, as it still defends and protects Christian Europe (Klapsis, 2015, 
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p.25). This, as opposed to the West, whose downfall will become inescapable if they do 
not revert back to the traditional values promoted by Putin. In similar vein, European 
states will have to turn their back on multiculturalism and globalisation, as both of these 
introduce foreign aspects into the state. 
 
1.4 Trojan Horses or Simply Similar Values 
It has been noted throughout this chapter that the relationship between Russia 
and the radical right has clearly strengthened over the years. However, is this 
connection just based on the very similar values that both parties tend to promote, or 
can this relationship be qualified as a Trojan Horse? By this, scholars such as Polyakova 
et al. (2016), Orestein (2014), and Mudde (2014) tend to imply that the Russian state 
tries to promote a negative agenda under the pretence of good intensions. In this case, 
the ‘good intensions’ can be construed as either developing or maintaining positive 
relations with political parties all over Europe (regardless of their party family). 
However, in reality this move should be perceived as anything but positive. In fact, 
Russia’s motive in establishing these connections can be understood as rather 
malevolent. After all, this alliance between the radical far-right and Russia may lead to 
disruptions within the EU. However, can it truly be said that Russia or the radical right 
have nefarious intentions? Moreover, is the relation between them strong enough that it 
functions as a Trojan Horse, or did they simply bond over shared conservative values 
and Eurosceptic sentiments? 
Cas Mudde, remains rather sceptical of the claim that Putin has successfully 
established Trojan Horses all over Europe. Although, he acknowledges that relations 
between Putin and the far-right have been enhanced over the years, he strongly believes 
that Le Pen’s party is the only one that structurally and openly cooperates with Russia 
(Mudde, 2014, n.p.). This argument makes sense, as Marine Le Pen had to admit to 
obtaining a 9-million-dollar loan through the First Czech Russian Bank in Moscow 
(Polyakova et al., 2016, p.7). Moreover, several members of the FN have established 
strong personal relations with members of the Russian government (Mudde, 2014). 
Various other far-right parties, such as the VB, Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary 
(Jobbik), and FPÖ, can also claim such relations (Mudde, 2014). Yet, no party, besides 
the FN and allegedly Jobbik, can state that they have documented connections with 
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Putin’s Russia. Furthermore, parties such as the FPÖ and VB have strongly denied any 
allegations of receiving monetary donations from Russia or any other foreign states 
(Mudde, 2014; Kijne & Delhaas, 2014).  
As a consequence, Mudde (2014, n.p.) argues that this affinity between Russia 
and the far-right is mostly based on individual connections, rather than on party 
relations. In fact, in response to a Political Capital Institute (2014) article, Mudde 
(2014) proclaims that most radical right-wing parties are neutral towards Russia, as 
opposed to being pro-Russian. Only parties such as the FN and Jobbik, but also Ataka 
and Golden Dawn portray pro-Russian sentiments. Whereas, parties such as FPÖ, VB, 
the Party for Freedom and the Danish People’s Party are perceived as being neutral 
towards Russia. Based on Mudde’s research, the author would also place UKIP and the 
AfD in this category. While UKIP’s Nigel Farage seems to admire Putin as a leader, the 
rest of the party appears lukewarm at most about the opportunity to openly support 
Russia and its leader (Klapsis, 2015; Larrabee et al., 2017). Finally, Mudde (2014, n.p.) 
concludes that there is no such thing as a Trojan Horse when it comes to the connection 
between Russia and the far-right. While some scrutiny should be given to this relation, 
most parties are simply not pro-Russian (enough), instead it is individual party members 
that portray this sentiment. Additionally, one should look into the EU’s political 
mainstream and major business companies, as they might actually argue in favour of 
stronger and better relations with Russia. 
Larrabee et al. (2017), who wrote an article about Europe-Russia relations in 
light of the Ukrainian Crisis, provide some interesting insights on the connection 
between far-right parties and Russia as well. However, they do not once mention the 
term ‘Trojan Horses’. Even though they appear to strongly value the influence that 
Russia can wield over the radical right, they do not believe that this can be described as 
a Trojan Horse just yet. They come to this conclusion by analysing the political 
vulnerabilities that European states experience, and how Russia uses these to exert overt 
and covert influence over them (Larrabee et al., 2017). One of the main vulnerabilities 
that the EU experiences is directly related to the radical right. That being said, the 
authors strongly question if this European weakness will actually lead to change. After 
all, while the number of populist EU parliamentarians may have increased significantly 
since the last EP elections, their influence on policy making has remained rather limited 
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(Larrabee et al., 2017, p.57-58). In fact, the only place where their impact could be 
somewhat noticeable is in agenda setting. This lack of power is mostly due to factors 
outside of their control, nevertheless this party family also diminishes their own place in 
the EP through focussing most of their attention on the national sphere. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the radical right has not made much progress in promoting the 
Russian angle (Larrabee et al., 2017). Nevertheless, this should not imply that relations 
between Russia and the radical right have not improved. Moreover, while this relation 
remains rather harmless now, it might become harmful to the EU at some point in the 
future. 
Even though Mudde (2016) and Larrabee et al. (2017) make a persuasive 
argument, most scholars as well as journalists would argue that Trojan Horses exist in 
the case of Russia and radical right-wing parties. This proves true in the case of 
Polyakova et al. (2016) and Klapsis (2015), but also in other works produced by 
Orestein (2014) and the Political Capital Institute (2014). Polyakova et al. (2016) only 
analyses cases of France (FN), Germany (Alternative für Deutschland; AfD), and the 
UK (UKIP). Klapsis (2015) takes a more general approach by including a large number 
of parties, including, but not limited to, all the cases included in this thesis (see Chapter 
3). Regardless, both come to the conclusion that Putin’s Trojan Horses exist and should 
be taken seriously. Klapsis (2015) comes to this conclusion because both sides share 
certain neo-conservative ideologies, mostly related to Christian values and principles of 
non-interference. Moreover, Klapsis (2015) claims that the radical right perceives 
Russia as a geopolitical alternative to the EU. Polyakova et al. (2016) provides a more 
general overview, as their research does not focus on just radical right parties. As a 
result, their research indicates that Trojan Horses can develop between Russia and any 
kind of party (left, right, and centre) that promotes pro-Russian sentiments.  
When analysing these different party groupings, such as the far-right, the far-
left, and centre parties, it would have been interesting to add a discussion on the 
different reasons why these parties could come to support pro-Russian attitudes. For 
example, is the far-right the only group that focusses on similar neo-conservative 
ideologies as well as alternative geopolitical powers, or do other groupings buy into this 
notion as well? Other discussions could develop around questions like: Are Trojan 
Horses, particularly between Russia and the far-right, more likely to develop in the 
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West compared to the East, or vice versa? Or, are there fundamental differences 
between Trojan Horses established in Eastern or Western Europe? While it is clear that 
I wish that these articles would have answered several other questions as well, I do 
believe they added significantly to the discussion on Trojan Horses. This mostly 
through describing how these relations could develop over the years, and by providing a 
large number of examples that indicate that Trojan Horses could exist. That being said, 
one should regard Trojan Horses with a certain degree of suspicion. After all, those that 
do not support this theory made valid inferences about the lack of effect that the radical 
right and Russia have on the EU and other Euro-Atlantic institutes.  
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2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Research Questions 
This thesis will look into the occurrence of pro-Russian stances in the European radical-
right. More specifically, it asks  
 
R1: To what extend is the pro-Russian sentiment a new external dimension of 
the radical right? 
 
R2: How do pro-Russian sentiments manifest themselves through the radical 
right’s foreign policy perspectives, party manifestos, parliamentary debates, and 
voting results? 
 
R3: What explains the similar/different patterns of pro-Russian sentiments in the 
radical right? 
 
R1 was established based on the results of previous studies that indicated that a 
relationship was developing between Russian and the radical right (see Mudde, 2014; 
Klapsis, 2015; Larrabee et al., 2017, Polyakova et al., 2016). R2 addresses the factors 
that lead to the radical right making a turn towards the East, in particularly towards 
Russia. R3 analyses the development of pro-Russian patterns, and why these came into 
being. The results of my research in regards to R1, R2, and R3 will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. The trends discovered will be analysed in detail in the following chapter 
(Chapter 5). 
 
2.2 Empirical Data 
 
The empirical material for this thesis is obtained through a large number of 
sources, and includes political party manifestos, debates within the EP, and EP voting 
records. Firstly, the manifestos and/or party programs of the six cases under discussion 
will be retrieved either from their official party websites or through the manifesto 
project database (found here: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/). Both methods should 
lead to the same party program, however in some cases the latter proves more 
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beneficial. This became especially apparent in the case of Jobbik, which only had older 
versions of its manifesto available on its English language website. Yet, the manifesto 
project database had obtained a more recent English version. In general, the author tried 
to obtain English versions of all party programs. However, this proved impossible in the 
case of the FPÖ, the FN, and the VB. The next paragraph will explain how the author 
dealt with these language issues. Besides specific language preferences, the author 
chose to use the most recent versions of the party programs, meaning that the author 
included the 2017 edition for the FN, the FPÖ, and UKIP, the 2016 edition for the AfD, 
and the 2014 edition for Jobbik and VB. In the case of Jobbik, the 2010 edition was also 
consulted, as the manifesto published in 2014 indicated that claims from that particular 
party program were still perceived as valid.  
Secondly, the debates in the EP were directly taken from the official EP website 
(found here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en). The author solely included 
discussions held during the eight term, which lasts from 2014 until 2019. All in all, 
seventeen debates were included, which discussed the political situation in regards to 
Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea. Debates that mostly focussed on economics or issues 
unrelated to the Ukrainian crisis were eliminated, as these would significantly and 
unduly widen the scope of this thesis. However, debates specifically discussing the AA 
were included, as it relates both to a political and economic angle in regards to Ukraine. 
It is important to note here that all statements were provided in the native language of 
the MEP. If statements were given verbatim, an English translation might be available. 
However, these translations are mostly there to facilitate the debates, and thus might not 
be a perfect translations of the original speech. Consequently, the author provided her 
own translations when statements were not in English. In the case of Dutch materials 
this did not pose a problem, as the author is native speaker in this language. When 
information was solely available in Hungarian, as proved the case with Jobbik, a native 
speaker was asked to provide translations. This due to a lack of knowledge on this 
language from the author’s side. All other information was available in either French or 
German, which the author has some working knowledge of. In this case, translations 
were initially made by the author, but native speakers were consulted to check if the 
translated versions matched the original content. This approach was also adopted when 
party programs were unavailable in English.  
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Finally, voting records were taken either from the official EP’s website or 
through votewatch (found here: http://www.votewatch.eu/). Again votes were only 
taken from the eighth term and specifically targeted votes related to foreign and security 
policies. In total six voting records were included, where 61 parliamentarians were able 
to vote. This is the same number of individuals that could state their opinion during the 
debates. However, on multiple occasions the Members of the European Parliament 
(MEP) opted to neither vote nor to use the debates to provide an opinion on the motions 
for resolution. Lastly it should be noted that, the author only analysed responses by 
MEPs that were elected or re-elected in 2014. Any MEP that entered the parliament 
after these elections was not included, this for the sake of clarity. However, those MEPs 
who chose to leave their respective parties or opted to leave the EP during the eight 
term, were taken into consideration until the day left. 
 
2.3 Methodological Approach and Issues 
 
 In order to answer my research questions, the author implemented a combination 
of both a qualitative and quantitative content analysis. The former was used when 
analysing the party manifestos and the debates, whereas the later enabled me to discuss 
the voting patterns. Initially, the author preferred to use one approach, but this simply 
would have made it impossible to prescribe any meaning to the votes taken in the EP. 
Thus, in order to come to some conclusions, I used a quantitative approach to code the 
votes of individual parliamentarians. The author chiefly considered the percentage of 
MEPs per party or per debate that voted in favour of Russia. Moreover, an attempt was 
made to determine if these MEPs were loyal or rebellious towards their faction (see 
Annex 3 for more information on the votes).  
 A significant part of this thesis depended on the use of the qualitative content 
analysis. In general, this approach is used to systematically ascribe meaning to large 
amounts of textual data by coding the material into different categories (Schreier, 2013). 
The necessary data could be taken from anywhere, including, but not limited to: 
interviews, books, focus groups, and observations (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Within 
this study, the author chose to solely look into debates and party programs as these 
presumably represent the radical and the (potentially) pro-Russian character best. 
Moreover, the author initially aimed to work through a deductive approach (Elo & 
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Kyngäs, 2007). This was done as some scholars have claimed that this method proves 
most beneficial when some “existing theory or prior research exists about a 
phenomenon that is incomplete or would benefit from further description” (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005. p.1281). Thus, according to this reasoning the author based the first 
round of coding on categories that naturally sprang from the literature as discussed in 
Chapter 1, these include, but are not limited to: pro-Russia, anti-EU, sovereignty back to 
the state, expansionism, and geopolitical alternative. Nevertheless, after the initial 
period of trial coding this method had to be abandoned, as it proved impossible to code 
certain segments of the data. After all, scholars such as Mudde (2014), Polyakova et al. 
(2016), Klapsis (2015), and Larrabee et al. (2017) each gravitated towards similar 
factors that affected the external dimension. Thus when foreign policy perspectives 
were discussed, these always zeroed in on the same points: Eurosceptism, anti-
expansionist and anti-integrationist tendencies, and pro-Russian sentiments. Yet, the 
author does not believe that that is all there is to the radical right’s foreign policy and its 
relation to Russia. Consequently, the author believed that it would prove beneficial to 
switch to a more inductive approach which implements open coding. By using this 
method, codes and their names flow naturally from the data (Elo & Kyngäs, 2007). As a 
result, the author was able to categorize all data that did not neatly fit in with the already 
existing theory. While the author perceives the open coding approach to be best suited 
to this endeavour, it has to be acknowledged that there could be some limitations to this 
approach, these will be discussed at a later point in this thesis. 
 For this research to be successful, the author will be following eight steps, as 
prescribed by Margrit Schreier (2013). Firstly, the author will decide on a specific topic 
and determine what research questions need to be answered (see segment 2.1 Research 
Questions). Secondly, the EP debates and party programs will be downloaded and if 
necessary translated. Based on the data, the coding frame will be established. While this 
framework will implement some codes that stem from the literature, most will be based 
on the data. Fourth, the data will be segmented in order for it to fit in one coding frame. 
Fifth, part of the material will be trial coded, the author will be using software from 
MAXQDA for this purpose. During the (trial) coding process, the author will introduce 
all codes on a sentence by sentence basis. However, if the same code can be used for 
multiple consecutive sentences, one code will encompass all relevant phrases. Once this 
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phase is finished, the coding frame will be evaluated and modified accordingly. 
Seventh, all materials will be coded during the main analysis phase (Schreier, 2013). 
The author will use at least three rounds of coding over a prolonged period of time, this 
will be done with the purpose to prevent mistakes and to enhance viability and 
trustworthiness. Finally, the results will be presented and interpreted3.  
 It has already been noted that this thesis intends to add to the theory on the 
relations between Russia and the radical right. While I believe that the qualitative 
content analysis, in particularly open coding, is best suited for this endeavour, it also 
comes with a number of problems. Most of these specifically relate to the problem of 
trustworthiness, reliability, and viability. Although flexibility is perceived as one of the 
major benefits of this approach, it comes at the cost of potentially losing viability. That 
being said, persistent observation and prolonged engagement may be able to enhance 
the credibility of this project (Hsies & Shannon, 2005). The author agreed with this 
notion, and as a result all textual data was coded at least three times. 
 Another issue has to do with the fact that most, if not all, codes are based on my 
own thoughts and reasoning. On the one hand, this approach might cause me to develop 
some good arguments. On the other hand, the author might miss certain categories due 
to a lack of understanding. As a consequence, the author may fail to recognize some key 
concepts and/or categories (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Which might result in an 
inaccurate representation of the data. That being said, prolonged engagement can aid in 
resolving this issue as well. Thus, as long as a significant amount of time is spent on 
analysing the data and the results, most problems that taint this approach will be 
resolved.  
 
2.5 Selection of Cases 
This research includes six cases: Alternative für Deutschland, Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs, Front National, Jobbik, UK Independence Party, and Vlaams Belang. 
To come to this case selection, the author first chose to solely take those parties that 
                                                
3 An effort will be made to discuss all coding categories and put them in context. That being said, some 
codes will receive limited to no attention at all. This because they may not aid in the answering of the 
research questions. However, this should not imply that these codes or the coded segments are irrelevant. 
In fact, the author would strongly recommend that more research is implemented on codes such as 
Democracy (positive) and Ukraine (negative), as these will not be used to their full potential in this work 
but could lead to valuable inferences in the future.  
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belong to the radical right party family. Furthermore, the author determined that she 
wanted to represent a diverse range of parties, where both similar and contradicting 
responses regarding the Ukrainian crisis and Russia could be expected. Based on that, 
the author included parties from both Eastern and Western Europe. Besides that, the 
author also aimed to incorporate those parties that were both older and younger, those 
that focus on a single issue and those that maintain opinions on a large number of policy 
areas, and those that clearly have (positive) relations with Russia and those that may or 
may not have this connection. Additionally, the author included parties that were both 
popular and unpopular on the local, national, and EU level. At this point it has become 
clear that the author desired to include parties that have similar ideologies but are not 
carbon copies of each other. Nevertheless, at this point some cases remained that did not 
make the final cut. The Dutch Freedom Party (de Partij voor Vrijheid), for example, was 
discarded as it professes some very liberal opinions in regards to social issues and 
traditional values. Moreover, its leader, Geert Wilders, choses to focus his party’s 
agenda mostly towards promoting anti-Islam sentiments. Switzerland, with the Swiss 
People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei), did not fit the scope of this research 
project either, as it is not part of the EU. The author also excluded the Baltic radical 
right as these parties tend to have very peculiar relations with Russia, and this would 
likely skew my results. Finally, several other parties were eliminated due to more 
practical concerns, such as the author not being able to speak certain languages. An 
exception was made for Jobbik. While the author does not speak Hungarian, this case 
was perceived as one of the best representatives of radical right parties in Eastern 
Europe. This due to the fact that very few parties can claim to be as radical as Jobbik, 
but more importantly, this party is one of the very few that allegedly has very good 
relations with Russia.  
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3. OUTLINING THE CASES 
 
Before turning to the empirical part of this thesis, the cases under discussion will be 
analysed on the bases of several foreign and national policy sub-themes. In particularly, 
attention will be given to these party’s stances towards the EU, immigration, and 
xenophobia. The author perceived this to be necessary, as some readers may be 
unfamiliar with these particular radical right parties.  
 
3.1 Anti-EU sentiments 
 The 90s became known as the decade that kick-started Eurosceptic tendencies. 
In the very same era, one of Europe’s most Eurosceptic parties, UKIP, came into being. 
In the early 1980s, Alan Sked, a professor at the London School of Economics, grew 
increasingly frustrated with the European Union and its wish for further integration. 
Initially, this lead him to join the Bruges Group which came into being shortly after 
Margaret Thatcher’s infamous Bruges speech (Usherwood, 2016). However, Sked 
would also become ill satisfied with this grouping, as it did not intend on pursuing a 
pure form of Euroscepticism (Usherwood, 2016; Hayton, 2016). As a result of this, Dr 
Sked established UKIP at in meeting in 1993 (Flamini, 2013). The party immediately 
established itself as a single-issue party, as its “sole policy was to provoke a British exit 
from the EU, by winning seats in the EP and then refusing to take them, so causing a 
constitutional crisis” (Usherwood, 2016, p.248). Yet, this policy would never come to 
fruition as UKIP failed to obtain any seats in the 1994 EP elections. Moreover, after 
struggling for survival for the next five years, the party realised that they needed to 
know what kind of system they were working against. Consequently, when UKIP was 
able to send three members to the EP, they immediately took this opportunity. 
Nevertheless, UKIP maintained its extremely negative stance towards the Union. 
Successfully so, as the UK is now bound to leave the EU.  
 Compared to UKIP, the FN is only slightly less Eurosceptic. This notion may 
appear surprising to some, as the FN actually spend a significant part of its existence 
promoting a pro-European stance. From 1972, when the party was created by Jean-
Marie Le Pen, until the late 1980s, the FN did not perceive any problems with the EU. 
After all, they were far too busy fighting against Communism and bolstering 
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nationalism (Morini, 2018, p.11). However, just like UKIP, the FN started to become 
critical towards the European Economic Community/EU as soon as the Maastricht 
Treaty was agreed upon. This agreement became synonymous with the Union taken 
sovereignty away from the state. As a result, the FN became radically opposed to the 
EU and its institutions, and so far, this sentiment has not waned. This became especially 
clear during the 2014 EP elections when the “FN firmly rejected austerity policies, 
called for an exit from the Euro, in order to ‘regain French sovereignty’, to implement 
protectionist economic measures and to revise the Schengen Agreement” (Morini, 2018, 
p.11). These sentiments were nothing new, as Jean Marie Le Pen had already 
announced his desire to leave the Union in 2002. These feelings were carried over to the 
new leadership as Marine Le Pen expressed the same wish. Yet she argued that this 
decision should be left to the people. Consequently, in her bid for presidency she 
advocated for a referendum where the French could decide whether or not they wished 
to remain in the Union (Front National, 2017; Morini, 2018). Nevertheless, during the 
last few decades the FN has not been able to successfully advance this position, and 
neither is it expected to do so in the future. This is partially due to the other French 
parties, who continued to perceive the EU in favourable terms. But more importantly, 
the FN has remained virtually powerless on the national level, and thus has been unable 
to press their position.  
 If one were to rank the case studies in this thesis according to their anti-EU 
tendencies, the FPÖ would fall somewhere in the middle. This mostly due to the fact 
that the FPÖ had phases of radicalisation, but also periods in which it mainstreams. 
Moreover, when the party was formed in 1956 by Anton Reinthaller, being Eurosceptic 
simply was not the norm. Instead the party became known for its libertarian character, 
and its German-nationalist, anti-Semitist, and anti-clerical policies (Heinisch & Hauser, 
2016; FPÖ Bildingsinstitut, 2017). Only in the 1990s did the party become dedicated to 
spreading the Eurosceptic message. Yet, this tendency would be short-lived, as the FPÖ 
mainstreamed itself in order to become part of the government in the early 2000s. This 
position of power was so important to the leadership that the FPÖ was willing to meet 
all the conditions set by the Christian-Democrats. Some of these requirements, such as 
supporting tolerance and the EU, directly went against the character of the party, yet 
Jorg Haider, the then leader of the FPÖ, knowingly went along with it. This may seem 
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surprising, but the FPÖ has been known to ignore its party program when this proves 
politically convenient, as was clearly the case in the 2000s. Haider’s approach initially 
seemed to pay off, as the FPÖ and the Christian-Democratic Party maintained good 
political relations, where both parties were able to promote their policy ideas. 
Nevertheless, as the FPÖ’s power started to diminish, it became more and more 
appealing to return to the policies that had been promoted during the 1990s. It was clear 
that the new head of the party, Heinz-Christian Strache, supported this notion as he 
started to re-introduce anti-EU sentiments (Heinisch & Hauser, 2016, p.79-81). While 
these anti-EU policies were definitely radical, Strache ensured that his tone was 
relatively moderate when he appeared in public, as this lead to more support among the 
population.  
 As one of the newer cases in this study, Jobbik did not start as an anti-EU party. 
In fact, when Jobbik came into existence in 2003 it had wanted closer alliances with the 
Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, when Hungary joined the Union in the same year, this 
institution had not appeared problematic. However, this positive attitude did not last for 
a long time, and Euroscepticism became the norm shortly after the financial crises of the 
late 2000s. During this period the Hungarian nation, in particularly Jobbik and its 
supports came to blame the Euro-Atlantic community for the poor socio-economic 
situation that the country was in. Consequently, the Jobbik leadership started to question 
whether or not EU Membership was in the best interest of Hungary, as it prevented 
them from effectively pursuing their own national interests (Kim, 2016, p.348). In the 
end, the leader of Jobbik, Gábor Vona, determined that Hungary would be better off 
establishing closer relations with the East, as this could offset the Euro-Atlantic 
community (Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary, 2010). Nevertheless, Jobbik still 
has not decided whether it will leave the EU or if the party wishes to renegotiate its 
relations with the Union (Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary, 2010). As Jobbik and 
other parties in Hungary keep radicalising, it may seem logical for them to choose the 
former option. However, this remains to be seen.  
In the case of the FPÖ and Jobbik one can clearly see that these countries have 
become more and more anti-EU since the late 2000s. The VB on the other hand has 
always maintained some degree of Euroscepticism, yet this was always presented as a 
secondary issue. Instead, the VB appears to prioritize Flemish nationalism over 
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Euroscepticism. While this preference has never changed, it should not be implied that 
the VB is happy to remain within the EU. For several decades, the VB leadership has 
argued that they do not intent to lose sovereignty to a meddlesome supra-nationalist 
organisation like the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2009, p.9). This sentiment became especially 
apparent in their latest manifesto, where they called upon the Flemish to leave the EU 
and establish its own state (Vlaams Belang, 2014). However, after leaving the Union, 
the VB intends to (re-)establish international cooperation likened to the situation before 
the Treaty of Maastricht. Moreover, a healthier currency will be introduced among 
those states that culturally similar to Flanders, such as Germany and the Netherlands 
(Vlaams Belang, 2014). 
While all parties in this study can be considered Eurosceptic, the AfD represents 
this sentiment least. In fact, it has always been difficult to promote anti-EU and radical 
stances in Germany. The former because German parties as well as the public tend to 
support the Union, and the latter because “German elites stigmatised National Socialism 
and criminalised the use of its symbols very early on whilst offering nationalist a home 
in the mainstream centre-right” (Arzheimer, 2015, p.54). Thus, politicians who may 
have identified with nativist, authoritarianist, and populist tendencies were discouraged 
from joining short-lived parties such as the Republicans. The creation of the AfD in 
2013 challenged both points. Former Christlich Demokratische Union and Freie 
Demokratische Partei members Bernd Lucke, Konrad Adam, and Alexander Gauland 
founded the party as they were no longer satisfied with their respective former parties. 
According to the AfD leadership, the German parliamentary parties failed to pick up on 
problems regarding the Eurozone, and were also not Eurosceptic enough (Decker, 2016, 
p.3). Still issues such as immigration and the law and order were prioritized. In 
particularly the former proved salient during the refugee crisis. Consequently, 
Eurosceptic sentiments were hardly promoted. This changed when Frauke Petry took 
over the party leadership, after Lucke and his main supporters felt forced to leave as the 
party had radicalised too much (Decker, 2016, p.7-9). Over time, the AfD has become 
more radical, and Euroscepticism has obtained a somewhat more prominent place on the 
agenda. Nevertheless, other issues feature more prominently in the foreign policy 
directive. Consequently, the AfD can be perceived as one of the least Eurosceptic 
radical right parties in this study, but also within Europe.   
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3.2 Anti-Immigration 
Immigration, or preferably the lack thereof, is another topic that has been on the 
far-right’s agenda for a long time. With the fall of the Soviet Union, these parties had 
hoped for “to the creation of independent, neutral states with robust foreign policies, 
precluding the need for immigration and multiculturalism” (Liang, 2008, p. 18). This 
particular perspective was popularized due to the fact that their nativist visions did not 
(and still does not) allow for any foreign elements to enter into their nation. 
Unfortunately for these parties, the fall of the Berlin Wall lead to a wave of migration 
from Eastern Europe. These anti-immigration tendencies have only strengthened among 
this party family, as multiple migration crises hit Europe during the 2000s and 2010s. 
Over the last 40 years, the FN has frequently pushed for anti-immigration 
policies. In fact, it can be said that (anti-)immigration has become the leitmotif of the 
party’s rhetoric (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017, p.107). Successfully so, as its negative 
stance towards ‘outsiders’ caused the FN to achieve its first electoral success. In 1983, 
secretary-general Jean-Pierre Stirbois won a mayoral election in Dreux, a city some 80 
kilometres from Paris, where the locals had come to fear Arab and Muslim immigrants 
and the social problems they brought along (Della Posta, 2013). The citizens of Dreux 
were certainly not the only ones bothered by these immigrants. Indeed, public opinion 
towards foreigners, especially those of non-Western decent, only got worse over the 
years. Especially considering that the local inhabitants wished to blame these 
immigrants for issues concerning unemployment, the healthcare system, and 
criminality. The FN cleverly played into these fears, as they not only started to criticize 
immigration, but also started to promote tougher policies on law and order. 
Additionally, they also argued that social programmes should only benefit the native 
inhabitants of the country as opposed to all of those that lived in France (Stockemer & 
Barisione, 2017, p.107). Thus, the anti-immigration policies that the FN promoted, 
affected other points on the agenda as well. All of these to the detriment of the 
‘outsiders’. Clearly, the French public bought into this rhetoric, as the FN started to 
receive significantly more voters after the refugee and migrant crises (Della Posta, 
2013).   
It has already been noted that the FPÖ has been willing to mainstream as part of 
a vote and office seeking strategy. However, since the early 1990s the party has 
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diligently pursued an anti-immigration agenda (Heinische & Hauser, 2016, p.74). 
Moreover, the party has made it clear that while it is willing to alter some of its policy 
positions, this is not the case when immigration is discussed. This became abundantly 
clear when the party entered government in 2000. At that time, the “FPÖ insisted on a 
very restrictive regime regarding immigrant quotas and family reunions” (Heinisch & 
Hauser, 2016, p.74). These policies might seem radical compared to immigration laws 
in other European states. However, these specific proposals were supported by a 
significant number of conservative members of the Austrian parliament. Moreover, in 
the eyes of the FPÖ and the Christian-Democrats, these policies were simply an 
extension of immigration laws already implemented by previous governments (Heinisch 
& Hauser, 2016, p.77). Nevertheless, just because the mainstream centre-right in 
Austria supports strict anti-immigration laws, does not mean that these laws are any less 
radical. Consequently, the FPÖ can be perceived as one of the most anti-immigration 
parties in this study. 
The AfD gets most of its radical character from its anti-immigration tendencies. 
Once the refugee crisis started in the early 2010s, the AfD knowingly played into the 
insecurities and anxieties of the population (Decker, 2016, p.10). The more refugees and 
immigrants came into their country, the louder the AfD called upon the government to 
change its laws regarding migration. That being said, this attitude had not always been 
promoted. In 2013 and 2014 the AfD had already become sceptical of migrants, yet at 
that point they were still willing to take those that offered economic benefits to the 
German state. Nevertheless, once the news media started to allege that Muslim refugees 
had raped a minor, the AfD felt the need to quickly respond by levelling staunch 
criticism against any and all immigrants (Moreira, 2018, n.p.). Shortly thereafter it 
became public knowledges that these allegations had been falsified, but this did not stop 
the AfD’s rally cries against immigration. After all, why would they change an 
approach that had proven effective in garnering support for their party. Moreover, this 
anti-immigration stance enabled them, like the FN, to promote other issues related to 
national-conservatism, such as law and order, and gender and family policies (Decker, 
2016, p.6). Finally, this strategy did not just lead to support from the average citizen, 
but also caused the extreme right-wing movement ‘Pegida’ to voice support for the AfD 
(Decker, 2016; Moreira, 2018).  
 35 
Both the VB and UKIP are far less focussed on anti-immigration policies 
compared to parties such as the FN, the FPÖ, and the AfD. That being said, both parties 
do include segments on (im)migration in their national party programs. Nevertheless, 
neither of them has made these policies into a priority issue. Instead the VB tends to 
direct all its attention towards Flemish nationalism and other national issues. Once 
independence is achieved, the VB might place a larger focus on leaving the EU or anti-
immigration sentiments. In the case of UKIP, the party has always prioritized its anti-
EU sentiments over immigration. However, now that Brexit talks have started, one may 
expect immigration to start to rank higher on the agenda (MacMillan, 2017, p.118). That 
being said, one has to question how impactful UKIP’s stance on immigration will be 
after the United Kingdom has left the Union. After all, UKIP remains plagued by a lack 
of representation on the national and local level.  
 Discussing anti-immigration tendencies makes sense in the context of Western 
European states, but the same cannot always be said for Eastern and Central Europe. In 
this region, radical right-wing parties tend to target national minorities as opposed to 
foreign migrants (Mares & Havlik, 2016; Nagy, Boros, & Vasali, 2013). So while the 
West tends to turn Muslims and Arabs into scapegoats, the radical right in Eastern and 
Central Europe appears to put the blame on Jewish and/or Roma parts of the population. 
Especially, the latter grouping is problematized by Jobbik and Hungarian civilians, as 
“sixty percent of the population maintains that the Roma “have crime in their blood,” 
and 42% agree with the policies of discos and restaurants that deny them entry” (Nagy, 
Boros, & Vasali, 2013, p.233). In 1999, when Jobbik was just a youth movement 
established by students from the Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, this anti-Roma 
stance was not yet popularised. This due in part to their close alignment to Fidesz, 
which at the time was a centre right party. However, the anti-Roma attitude was quickly 
introduced once Gábor Vona, one of the party’s leaders, realised that their place in civil 
society would not prove sufficient in realising their ‘national radical’ platform (Kim, 
2016, p.346). As a result, the leaders opted to transform their movement into a political 
party in 2003 (Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary, 2016). Immediately thereafter 
Jobbik made a name for itself by claiming to protect ‘Hungarian interests and values’ 
(Kim, 2016, p.346). In order to do so successfully, they would specifically target the 
Roma, as a significant part of the Hungarian population already believed that these 
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people were to blame for all negativity that occurred in their country. Nowadays 
problems related to the Roma still top the agenda, however the refugee crisis did force 
Jobbik to promote an anti-immigration stance as well. The Hungarians did not perceive 
this move as radical, as most, if not all, Hungarian parties strongly believe that their 
nation-state will suffer the consequences if the country is to take (more) migrants. 
 
3.3 Xenophobia 
 It has been noted in Chapter 1 that most, if not all, radical right-wing parties 
strongly support national conservatism. One of the corner stones of this ideology is 
Christianity, a religion which the far-right perceives as the very basis of Western 
civilisation. Consequently, parties, such as the FN and Jobbik, will do everything in 
their power to protect, defend, and promote Christian values. In the same vein, these 
parties will ensure that foreign religions have no place in their society. This especially 
proves true in the case of the Islam, as it is perceived as “anti-modern, anti-democratic, 
patriarchal, [and a] violent dogmatic religion belonging to a lower level of civilization” 
(Liang, 2008, p.21). On top of that, foreign cultures and internal minorities are also ill 
conceived, this becomes especially apparent in the case of the Jewish and Roma 
communities. Thus, anyone supporting these religions and/or cultures, in particularly 
those belonging to migrant communities, will be looked down upon. 
 It has already been noted that Jobbik has a rather different position on 
immigration compared to the other cases in this study. Moreover, while Western 
European parties distinguish between policies regarding immigration and xenophobia, 
the same cannot be said for Jobbik. In this case, lines are blurred and policies against 
the Roma and Jewish population are both xenophobic as well as anti-immigrant. This, 
likely due to the fact that Hungary has not suffered consequences of a significant 
number of foreigners moving into their nation. Thus, instead they are able to focus all 
their attention on national minorities. This seems like a logical move to the Jobbik 
leadership, as they believe that promoting anti-Semitist, racist, and anti-Roma policies 
is acceptable (Nagy, Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.233-234). Over time these racist 
tendencies have become more and more apparent. So much so, that a small segment of 
the Hungarian population has come to believe that Jobbik has gone too far. That being 
said, most Hungarians remain very prejudiced towards the gypsy population. The fact 
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that the Roma have not integrated well, certainly has not helped the issue. The situation 
has grown so tense that scholars cannot help but equate the situation to a ticking time 
bomb, simply waiting to explode (Nagy, Boros & Vasali, 2013). 
 Like Jobbik, the VB also has a history in which xenophobia plays a key-role. 
This became especially apparent during the last two decades of the 20th century. In 
1978, when Karel Dillen and Lode Claes established the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc), 
the party immediately “carved a niche for itself on the right of the political spectrum by 
championing the cause of Flemish nationalism, anticommunism, anti-abortion, pro-
apartheid and pro-amnesty for the Nazi collaborators” (Erk, 2005, p.496). Even though 
some issues decreased in importance over time, the same cannot be said for the racist 
and anti-Semitist sentiments. In fact, these only increased salience. So much so that the 
Belgian government claimed that the VB had taken radicalisation and xenophobia to a 
new extreme. During the same period, the party’s popularity among the Flemish 
population had expanded steadily. Consequently, the government felt that it could do 
nothing but impose a cordon sanitaire against the party (Erk, 2005; Pauwels, 2011). 
Meaning that no party would work or cooperate with the VB. Nevertheless, the VB 
continued to promote xenophobic policies until 2004, when the Court of Cassation 
decided that the VB had breached the Moureaux law (a law which specifically deals 
with racism). At this point, dismantling the party proved the only option, yet shortly 
thereafter the old members of the VB founded a new radical right party named Vlaams 
Belang (Flemish Interest; VB) (Erk, 2005). This party, like its predecessor, promotes 
Flemish nationalism and xenophobic tendencies, yet they ensure that all their policies 
are styled in a less overtly racist manner, so that they cannot be sued or disbanded 
again.  
 In a similar vein, the FN also started out with a leadership that was increasingly 
xenophobic. In particularly, the leadership became known for issuing statements 
denying the Holocaust, and thus anti-Semitism became the norm within the party 
(Ivaldi, 2016, p.232). The French government perceived these declarations as so 
outrageous, that they eventually came to impose a cordon sanitaire on the FN. By 
electing Marine Le Pen as the new party leader in 2011, the party had hoped to rid 
themselves of their pariah profile, nevertheless the cordon sanitaire has remained in 
place. Still, the younger Le Pen has taken it upon herself to eliminate any explicit racist 
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and anti-Semitist remarks. Furthermore, the new FN has made it clear that Holocaust 
denial and connections with neo-fascist groups are no longer tolerated. It immediately 
became clear that Le Pen took this stance seriously, because shortly thereafter she was 
forced to expulse her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, since he had questioned the existence 
of Nazi gas chambers (Ivaldi, 2016, p.232). Regardless of the efforts made, the image of 
the FN has hardly improved. As a result, Le Pen decided in early 2018 that a name 
change was in order, as the old one held negative connotations. Moving forward, the FN 
will be renamed ‘Rassemblement National’. Nevertheless, this new name may not seem 
like an improvement to some. Because during the WWII, a party called Ressemblement 
National Populaire came to support the Nazi’s (Vermaas, 2018).  
 The FPÖ followed a similar track to the FN, where it has mainstreamed a little 
over the years. That being said, its beginning (and to some extend its ending) is 
anything but mainstream. The FPÖ was established shortly after the WWII by war 
veterans and Nazi-sympathisers. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that anti-
Semitist policies became the norm. Overtime, as anti-immigration sentiments started to 
increase, the party also came to criticize other cultures and religions. In the mid to late 
2000s, it were specifically those supporting the Islam that were put in a negative light, 
as opposed to the Jewish population (Heinisch & Hauser, 2016, p.87). However, once 
the FPÖ became part of the government, the leadership quickly realised that they could 
no longer permit themselves to promote these overtly xenophobic policies, as this 
would hamper their vote and office seeking strategy. So while racist policies remained 
the standard, the party ensured that they presented themselves in a more moderate 
manner in public. This approach is best seen in the early 2010s, as Heinz-Christian 
Strache claimed that Muslims would have a place in the FPÖ, yet at the same time the 
party used an anti-Muslim platform in local elections in Vienna (Heinisch & Hauser, 
2016, p.87-88). 
 The last two cases under discussion, UKIP and the AfD are not nearly as 
xenophobic as parties such as Jobbik and the VB. That being said, both parties do 
promote the use of anti-Muslim policies. In the case of UKIP, these policies are mostly 
tied in with their stance on immigration, which also singles out Muslim individuals. 
Nevertheless, both these issues do not rank particularly high on their agenda. According 
to Rafael Behr this due to “the paradox of British political xenophobia – the racist 
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element in populism must be discreet because overt racism isn’t popular” (2013, p.11). 
Of course, some xenophobic statements can still be found, but not to the extent of other 
far right parties. In the case of the AfD xenophobia also does not appear to be the norm. 
Yet, the party has been known to use slogans such as “Islam has no place in Germany” 
(“News March 2018”, 2018). That being said, recently a leading member of the AfD, 
Arthur Wagner has converted to the Islam (“News March 2018”, 2018). Even though it 
remains unclear whether or not Wagner will remain in the party, he claims to be loyal to 
the AfD. Regardless of what happens in the future, one cannot claim that either the AfD 
or UKIP are known for its xenophobic sentiments.  
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4. RESULTS  
 
4.1 National Party Programs 
 When analysing the party programs of the cases under discussion, one has to 
realise that not every party perceives the EU and foreign policy strategies in a similar 
manner. Certainly, it cannot be denied that both these topics tend to be taken into 
account. However, certain parties may come to prioritize the EU and/or other foreign 
policy angles, whereas others may perceive them as secondary issues. The latter is best 
seen in the case of the VB which tends to prioritize Flemish nationalism over 
Euroscepticism (coded: anti-EU). UKIP, on the other hand, has made the EU a foreign 
policy priority by continuously discussing Brexit (coded: anti-EU). That being said, 
most parties chose to prioritize the domestic sphere, and as a result their manifestos 
mostly focus on issues concerning: welfare, education, families, urban planning, and the 
rule of law. This for the logical reason that these topics actually interest and affect the 
local population in a more direct manner. Consequently, those programs that mostly 
concern themselves with the domestic sphere may prove less insightful (in regards to 
this thesis) compared to those that direct more attention to foreign policy issues. In the 
next few paragraphs the results of several prevalent foreign policy issues will be 
discussed. 
 
4.1.1 Anti-EU but pro-Europe 
 All parties included in this study can be described as Eurosceptic, some more so 
than others. Based on the party programs, Jobbik and the AfD appear least sceptical 
toward the Union. While both parties perceive tremendous problems with the EU, both 
are still willing to remain in this supranationalist entity as long as fundamental reforms 
are implemented (AfD, 2016; Jobbik, 2014). All the other parties in this study appear 
less lenient, some like the VB call for the immediate decommissioning of the Union. 
Whereas others, like the FN, appear to favour a national referendum (as was done in the 
UK), where the people get to determine whether or not they wish to remain in the EU. 
The FPÖ, while clear in its distaste towards the EU, does not indicate if leaving the 
organisation is perceived as desired. All stances towards the Union are represented in 
Table 1. which is available on the next page. 
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Table 1. The Radical Right on Staying in or Leaving the EU   
AfD: Should we not succeed with our ideas of a fundamental 
reform within the present framework of the European Union, 
we shall seek Germany's exit, or a democratic dissolution of 
the EU, followed by the founding of a new European 
economic union. 
Undecided, but rather 
leaving 
FN: For this [talks about the EU], a negotiation will be 
initiated with our European partners, followed by a 
referendum on our membership of the European Union. The 
objective is to achieve a European project that is respectful of 
French independence, national sovereignties, and will serve 
the interest of the people. Leaving 
FPO: However, the sovereignty as well as the ideal of a 
Europe of Nations is increasingly threatened by the current 
developments in the European Union. Especially, since the 
objective of the EU has turned into a centralized bureaucratic 
hole. Unclear 
 Jobbik: Hungary's bondage to the EU. There are two option: 
renegotiate our relations with the EU or quit the EU and 
implement a Central European cooperation alternative.  Undecided 
UKIP: UKIP believes that the UK should have already left the 
EU, and that following the Article 50 process will lead us to 
make too many concessions to Brussel. Leaving 
 VB: The VB wants to stop the evolution towards an EU-
Superstate, and a bigger Belgium. Besides the separation of 
Belgium, the VB also wants an orderly decommissioning of 
the EU and the Eurozone. Leaving 
 
 
 Besides agreeing that the Union is ultimately bad for the nation-state, most parties 
are also in unison on the reasons why one should leave the EU, these include, but are 
not limited to: the EU starting to resemble a super state (coded: United States of 
Europe) which lacks democratic accountability (coded: Democracy (negative)); the EU 
continuously promoting an undesirable expansionist (coded: Expansion) rhetoric; the 
Union unjustly gaining more and more power (coded: sovereignty to the EU) as 
sovereign decision-making capabilities are moved from the state to the EU; and finally 
the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties (coded: Pre-Maastricht/ pre-Lisbon) have caused a 
competence creep within the Union. Based on the currently existing literature as well as 
on the results found in this study (see Mudde, 2007; Klapsis, 2015; Minkenberg, 2017; 
Polyakova et al., 2016), it has become clear that calling out the EU on its tremendously 
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problematic behaviour has become something short of the norm among the radical right. 
Regardless, these parties do acknowledge that Europe itself is still perceived favourably, 
this is done by referencing a ‘Europe of Nations’ or a ‘Europe of Fatherlands’ in their 
party programs. In fact, the VB, the AfD, Jobbik, and the FPÖ perceive the continent so 
positively, that all state the desire to return to an earlier version of the EU. In 
particularly, they would prefer an alliance likened to the situation before the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992. This because “for decades, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
contributed to peace and prosperity in Western Europe (1957 to 1993) (AfD, 2016, 
p.16; coded: Pre-Maastricht/ pre-Lisbon). These stances, like the ones on the EU, 
appear to be consistent with the already existing literature in this field.  
 
4.1.2 International Cooperation 
When discussing foreign policies, most radical right-wing parties will include a 
short segment on the states or institutions that they wish to cooperate with on a regular 
basis (coded: International cooperation). Some parties have very specific regions in 
mind with whom they wish to cooperate. For example, the FN aims to mostly focus its 
attention on improving relations with the French speaking part of Africa (Front 
National, 2017). Moreover, Jobbik (2010; 2014) seeks to improve relations with the Far 
East as well as South-East Asia, this with the purpose to turn Hungary into a bridge 
between the East and West. Besides these particular relations, most parties also 
provided stances on the United States as well as on Russia. In the case of the latter, one 
would expect (potential) relations to be perceived favourably. After all, the Kremlin 
shares some similar conservative ideologies with the radical right, and could also 
represent a geopolitical alternative to the EU (Klapsis, 2015). The results appear to 
somewhat match these expectations. The AfD, Jobbik, and UKIP all indicated that they 
wish to strengthen ties with Russia (see Figure 1 on the next page). However, in the 
case of UKIP this positive perspective is based on the presumption that Russia will start 
to act less aggressively towards the West (UK Independence Party, 2017). The FPÖ also 
seems somewhat inclined to support relations with Russia. However, this ties in more 
with pragmatic reasons. Indeed, the FPÖ leadership strongly argues in favour of 
enhancing relations with Russia, as this is expected to positively affect the Austrian 
agricultural sector. Thus, this stance is mostly based on the benefits that Austria may 
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attain through this connection, as opposed to truly perceiving Russia as a friendly 
nation. Therefore, the author would argue that the FPÖ mostly promotes a neutral stance 
towards Russia through its party manifesto. The last two cases in this study, the FN and 
VB, have made no mention of Russia in their party programs. However, this should not 
imply that they are radically opposed to relations with Russia. In fact, works by Mudde 
(2014) and Polyakova et al. (2016) have proven that the FN is one of the few parties 
that has documented relations with Russia. Thus, while a pro-Russian attitude has not 
become apparent through these manifestos, it should not be assumed that it does not 
exist, it simply remains unknown if one solely considers this platform. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Radical Right’s Stance Towards Russia 
 
Most of the parties included in this study, with the exception of the FN, also 
include statements on the U.S. in their party programs. Unlike the relations with Russia, 
cooperation with the United States tends to be described both in positive and negative 
terms. Both the FPÖ and VB perceive the United States negatively. The latter came to 
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hold this opinion in response to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), which the VB perceived as undemocratic (coded: Anti-U.S.). Additionally, the 
party argued that this free trade agreement was lacking in transparency (Vlaams Belang, 
2014, p.10). The FPÖ also does not look favourably upon international agreements with 
the U.S., this because they are fearful of losing their national sovereignty and principles 
of neutrality due to American influence (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, 2017, n.p.). 
Interestingly enough, the AfD, Jobbik, and UKIP maintain a complete opposite stance, 
and continue to be strong supporters of cooperation with the United States. Both the 
AfD and UKIP describe the U.S. as a state that has always been an ally, and is thus 
deserving of their consideration. Jobbik also supports a good working relation with the 
U.S., but they are not nearly as enthusiastic about this state as the AfD and UKIP. In 
fact, Jobbik’s party program has indicated that: “with the United States we intend [to] 
develop the kind of bilateral relationship, which consistently and transparently promotes 
our national interests” (Jobbik, 2010, p.21). However, at this point in time, they no 
longer feel comfortable with unquestioningly following the foreign policy perspective 
of the EU and the North Atlantic region, as this will likely hamper their own foreign 
policy agenda. All in all, the results indicate that Jobbik remains in favour of 
international cooperation with the U.S., but only as long as it suits their needs. The 
other parties included in this thesis may also come to support this notion, as national 
interest may come to trump relations with the U.S., Russia, or any other state.  
 
4.1.3 Defence Alliances 
 Besides questioning which countries they should and should not cooperate with, 
the radical right also tends to discuss its opinions on defence alliances in its party 
programs. Within this sample, there appear to be three types of perspectives, (1) the 
party wishes to or has joined NATO (coded as: pro-NATO), (2) the party does not wish 
to join any alliance, and is against NATO (coded as either: anti-NATO or Defence by 
the state), and (3) the party aims to join another defence alliance (coded as: Defence 
alliance). Regardless of their stances on defence alliances, all parties included in this 
study agree that their national defence system needs to be updated and expanded. UKIP 
and the AfD aim to upgrade their military, navy, and air force through NATO. This due 
to the fact that they expect this alliance to aid them in (re)developing their foreign and 
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security politics. Moreover, joining this defence alliance seemed like a logical choice, 
especially considering that both parties perceive the U.S., the major player in this 
organisation, in rather favourable terms. While this attitude may suite UKIP and the 
AfD, all other parties look less favourably towards NATO. While the VB does not 
specifically mention NATO, it does appear to favour other defence alliances with like-
minded states. The FN, however, is strongly opposed to NATO as well as other 
alliances, as it fears getting involved in wars that are not its own (Front National, 2017). 
This anti-NATO stance is also well represented in the case of the FPÖ, which is 
interesting considering that Austria is not part of this defence alliance.  
 Even though most parties remain in favour of NATO or other defence alliances, 
all have become sceptical of getting involved in wars without their explicit permission. 
They all agree with the FN’s rhetoric that they can only continue to support defence 
alliances as long as their security concerns are taken into account. In fact, both UKIP 
and the AfD state that they only wish to involve themselves in NATO missions if there 
is either a UN mandate or explicit approval from their national government. The VB 
seems to think along the same lines and indicated that: “taking part in an alliance or any 
other form of international cooperation should not lead to a loss of choice in regards to 
buying into weapon systems or participating in operations” (Vlaams Belang, 2014, p.11; 
coded: Defence alliance). Similar sentiments can be found in party programs of the FPÖ 
and Jobbik as well. Consequently, it should be noted that the radical right only favours 
defence alliances as long as this does not come at the cost of losing their sovereignty. 
 
4.1.4 Conclusions 
 Finally, the author combined all results discussed in previous segments into 
Table 2., which is available on the next page. Based on this table it becomes apparent 
that the AfD and UKIP follow a rather similar pattern. Both favour relations with 
Russia, the U.S. and NATO. Jobbik’s manifesto indicates a somewhat comparable 
pattern, but they have opted to distance themselves from NATO. The FPÖ and VB also 
share some similarities as both negatively perceive the U.S. Moreover, while Austria 
has not joined NATO and probably will not do so in the future, both the FPÖ and the 
VB appear sceptical of this particular defence alliance. Finally, the FN can be described 
as an outlier, as it only indicated a disdain towards the EU and NATO. However, the FN 
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may have simply become an aberration due to a lack of information. That being said, all 
cases could have become an anomaly, as little information was available in most cases. 
As mentioned previously, most party manifestos favour a large range of topics, but the 
majority of the issues discussed appear relate to the domestic sphere. Consequently, 
little space tends to be dedicated to the party’s relations with the EU, the U.S., NATO, 
and Russia. As a result, one should look at the results represented in Table 2 with a 
certain degree of suspicion.  
 
Table 2. The Radical Right’s Perspective of the West, Western Institutions, and Russia 
Based on Party Programs.  
 
 EU Russia US NATO 
AfD Against In favour In favour In favour 
FN Against Unclear Unclear Against 
FPÖ Against Neutral Against Against* 
Jobbik Against In favour In favour Rather against 
UKIP Against Rather in favour In favour In favour 
VB Against Unclear Against Rather against 
*Austria is not a member of NATO, and the FPÖ aims to keep it this way, as joining 
this alliance would hamper the state’s neutral position.  
 
4.2 Debates in the EP 
 In order to truly understand how the radical right perceives Russia, Ukraine, and 
the West, 17 debates, that were held between 2014 and the end of 2017, were analysed. 
Debate topics included: the state of EU-Russia relations (09-07-2015; 10-07-2015); the 
situation in Ukraine (14-01-2015; 15-01-2015; 10-02-2015; 14-10-2015; 15-07-2014; 
17-07-2014); the strategic military situation in the Black Sea Basin following the illegal 
annexation of Crimea by Russia (10-06-2015; 11-06-2015); the Ukrainian political 
prisoners in Russia and the situation in Crimea (16-03-2017); the deterioration of the 
situation in Eastern Ukraine (14-02-2017); Crimean Tatars (12-05-2016); deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (20-01-
2016; 21-01-2016); and the situation in Ukraine and the state of play of EU-Russia 
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relations (16-09-2014; 18-09-2014). Some of these debates were held over the span of 
multiple days. Moreover, some, such as the debate on ‘the situation in Ukraine’ were 
brought up repeatedly in 2014 and 2015. All spoken and written responses by individual 
FN, FPÖ, VB, UKIP, Jobbik, and AfD MEPs were collected and then submitted to three 
rounds of coding (see Annex 1 for the coding scheme; see Annex 2 for the raw data on 
the debates as well as party manifestos). In the following paragraphs the results will be 
presented. In particularly, the author will focus on positive stances towards Russia, 
neutral to negative stances towards Russia, and stances towards the West. For more 
information on the results and the interpretation thereof, see Chapter 5. Before any of 
the data is presented, a short discussion will be presented on the reports written by the 
EU Commissions. 
 
4.2.1 EU Reports 
 In this thesis, reports written by EU Commissions on issues such as Russia and 
Ukraine will not be discussed individually. This due to the fact that none of the radical 
right MEPs under consideration were part of the commissions that wrote these. Thus, it 
may be presumed that the radical right’s opinion on these issues is not well represented, 
if at all. That being said, some background knowledge on the general gist of these 
reports is necessary in order to truly grasp the content of the debates. In general, these 
joint motions for resolution condemn Russia for its aggressive behaviour in Ukraine, in 
particularly in Crimea (2014/2717(RSP)). Moreover, these reports stress that the 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula violated democratic principles and international 
law, and is thus perceived as illegal. As a consequence, the EU has started to argue that 
the Russian Federation can no longer be perceived as a strategic partner 
(2015/2001(INI)). Nevertheless, the EU also acknowledges that communication and 
diplomacy are key, and should be used instead of violence in order to resolve this 
conflict with Russia (2015/2036(INI)). At the same time, the Union aims to instigate 
cooperation with Ukraine through the AA, with the hopes of establishing a more stable, 
democratic, and less corrupt nation-state. All in all, one can conclude that the EU strives 
for closer relations with Ukraine and continues to censure Russia for annexing Crimea. 
Thus, based on these reports as well as on the information presented in Chapter 1, one 
could presume that the radical right would protest these joint motions for resolution, as 
 48 
this would show their pro-Russia and anti-EU stance. Over the course of the next few 
pages the results will be analysed, and the author will illustrate whether or not this 
believe proves true.  
 
4.2.2 Positive sentiments towards Russia 
 According to the literature, one could reasonably speaking expect the radical 
right to perceive Russia in favourable terms. Based on the coded segments this would 
also appear to be the case as 43 pro-Russian (coded: Pro-Russia) statements were found 
in the debates under discussion. This particular code represents two strands of pro-
Russian claims: one where the radical right actually applauds Russia’s behaviour, and 
another where radical MEPs defends Russia against allegations made by anti-Russian 
parliamentarians. An example of the latter can be found in a statement by Dominique 
Bilde, a FN member who stated that: “Remember for the umpteenth time that Russia is 
not an adversary, and even less an enemy of European nations”. The radical right then 
used these statements to try and reshape Russia’s image from that of an antagonist into 
that of an ally. Interestingly enough, these pro-Russian sentiments only manifested 
within certain radical right parties, and not throughout the whole spectrum of parties 
included in this study. Only the FPÖ, the FN, and Jobbik believed that they should 
advocate the Russian position, and mostly did so by turning the Russian state into the 
victim of the West’s aggressive behaviour in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, these pro-
Russian statements were frequently followed by anti-EU sentiments, critical accounts of 
EU resolutions, and/or a justification explaining why Russia’s behaviour was 
completely within reason.  
 Criticizing the motions for resolution that were promoted within the EU, became 
a common feature among the radical right (EU resolutions was coded 66 times). After 
all this approach killed two birds with one stone. Firstly, these statements showed that 
the reports and the motions discussed had an inherent disposition against Russia, and 
that the EU would not give the Russian government the benefit of the doubt. This point 
of view became especially apparent through statements such as: “The resolution is 
unbalanced, subjective and provocative, and will surely not reassure all sides of this 
unsatisfactory situation” (Barbara Kappel). Secondly, by questioning the objectivity of 
these reports, the radical right tried to delegitimize and undermine the EU. While it 
 49 
remains questionable if they succeeded in the latter, this approach appeared perfect for 
those that were inclined to support Russia, as it showed both Anti-EU and Pro-Russia 
sentiments. 
 Besides calling the EU out on its subjective resolutions, the FN, FPÖ, and 
Jobbik also promoted the Russian angle by calling for improved EU-Russia relations 
(coded: Positive relations). They mostly did so, by arguing that economic relations with 
Russia would prove beneficial to the European industry, in particularly the agricultural 
sector was meant to be enhanced through this cooperation (coded: Economic relations 
with Russia). Additionally, some members from the FN have argued that Russia could 
potentially become a geopolitical alternative to Western influence (coded: Geopolitical 
alternative). Consequently, the FN, the FPÖ, and Jobbik could not see any reason why 
relations between these entities should not improve. While these parties were arguing in 
favour of this alliance, they were also bemoaning how the EU’s aggressive behaviour 
has led to the deterioration of EU-Russia relations (coded: Negative relations). Again 
the FN, FPÖ, and Jobbik stressed that Russia has been turned into the antagonist by the 
majority factions within the EU, and undeservedly so. Especially considering that the 
EU was not willing to compromise (either). These sentiments, as well as other 
favourable stances on Russia have been summarized in Table 3, which is available on 
the following page. 
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Table 3. Motives for supporting Russia   
"Moreover, the trigger and cause of this conflict is exclusively 
sought on the Russian side, I have decided against the report". Pro-Russia 
"The proposals in this report are completely unbalanced and 
one-sided. In my opinion, the motion for resolution would 
only aggravate the conflict". EU Resolution 
"This state [Russia] should remain an ally and not the reverse, 
the framework of diplomatic relations between the EU and 
Russia should be carried out with a spirit of mutual 
understanding, of a lasting partnership". Positive relations 
"I reject the report on the state of EU-Russia relations as a 
whole. Once more, Russia is pointed out as the big bad wolf 
who, intentionally, seeks to provoke chaos in Europe and to 
satisfy its alleged bitter imperialist tendencies". Negative relations 
"Russia is a key economic partner to us, thus an embargo is 
not a solution". 
Economic relations with 
Russia 
"This is a grave political mistake: it is advisable to positively 
perceive the accession into a multipolar world, a world in 
which France and Europe would no longer be subjected to 
great foreign powers". Geopolitical alternative 
 
Finally, the FPÖ, Jobbik, and especially the FN, used the Crimean crisis to 
strongly argue in favour of Russia. All, adopted the democratic referendum (coded: 
Democratic referendum), the principle of self-determination (coded: Self-
determination), the Russo-Georgia war (coded: Russo-Georgian war), and occasionally 
the Kosovo conflict (coded: Kosovo conflict) as ways to justify the annexation of 
Crimea to Russia. In particularly the former two were mentioned a significant amount 
of time (22 and 25 times respectively). These specific forms of justification were used 
not only to promote the Russian angle, but also to turn the EU into a scapegoat as they 
were unwilling to respect the free will of the Crimean population. This sentiment is best 
encompassed through a statement by FN’s Marie-Christine Arnautu: “The EU does not 
recognize the referendum of the 16th of March 2014, it refuses the right of self-
determination of the inhabitants of Crimea, it denies democracy and the right of people 
to arrange themselves”. Besides criticizing the Union’s lack of respect for referendums 
and principles of self-determination, the radical right also occasionally mentioned the 
Russo-Georgia war and the Kosovo conflict (ten and four times respectively). The latter 
was brought up because the radical right believed that Kosovo could serve as a 
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precedent for the Crimean case. Furthermore, the former was mentioned in order to 
demonstrate that Russia was not always responsible for conflicts in its near abroad, as 
was the case with the Russo-Georgia war which was caused by Georgia. Finally, several 
MEPs also indicated a degree of scepticism regarding the usage of the word ‘illegal’ in 
relation to the Crimean annexation (coded: ‘Illegal’). After all, they argued that the 
Crimean population had wanted to join Russia, thus the annexation should not be 
perceived as illegal or unlawful. A summary of the author’s main findings regarding 
Crimea and how this case was used to justify Russia’s behaviour can be found in Table 
4. 
 
Table 4. Justifying the annexation of Crimea to support Russia   
"The right of peoples to self-determination and the right of 
ethnic groups to strive for a peaceful change of national 
borders must be respected". Self-determination 
“A free, fair and democratic referendum is a legitimate 
expression of the will of the people of a state or region”. Democratic referendum 
"In particularly, the country [Russia] is accused of being 
responsible for the Georgian conflict. However, a report by the 
independent international commission has proven the 
opposite". Russo-Georgian conflict 
"Moreover, international law provides several precedents, 
where states achieved independence, e.g. Kosovo.". Kosovo conflict 
"It [the resolution] speaks clearly about the illegal annexation 
of Crimea, although this is controversial under international 
law". 
‘Illegal' Crimea 
annexation 
 
 
4.2.3 Neutral and negative sentiments towards Russia 
 It has become clear that parties like the FN, Jobbik, and the FPÖ subscribe to the 
pro-Russian stance that was expected based on the literature. However, the same cannot 
be said for the VB, the AfD, and UKIP. These parties tend to perceive Russia either as 
neutral, or more in line with the EP’s majority factions, as an adversary. The VB mostly 
indicated neutral feelings towards Russia. However, it should be noted, that most 
neutral statements, not only by the VB but also by the other parties in this study, do not 
truly indicate neutral sentiments in regards to Russia, but instead simply indicate that 
the word ‘Russia’ or ‘Russian’ was used in a manner that was neither positive nor 
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negative. Nevertheless, a statement by VB parliamentarian Gerolf Annemans indicates 
what it means to be truly neutral towards Russia. He stated that: “If the European Union 
is in favour of free trade let them lift the trade barriers against Russia. After all, the 
consequences for a large number of European farmers are immense”. Initially this 
statement seems to slightly favour Russia, but Annemans appears to mostly focus on the 
advantages that European farmers may receive if sanctions were to be ended. Thus, 
instead of perceiving Russia as an ally, the VB just used pragmatic reasons to argue in 
favour of (economic) relations with Russia. Based on statements such as these, the 
author would qualify the VB as a neutral or somewhat pro-Russian actor. The AfD can 
be characterized somewhat similarly in the sense that it submitted neutral statements as 
well. That being said, several AfD MEPs were not satisfied with being neutral, and have 
called out Russia on its aggressive behaviour, see Figure 2 for example.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Russia as an Adversary or a Neutral Actor. 
 
Moreover, while the AfD was able to justify some of Russia’s behaviour, they were not 
willing to legitimize the Crimean annexation. In particularly, Ulrike Trebesius and 
Bernd Lucke immediately condemned the annexation of Crimea by Russia, as they 
perceived this act to be illegal. Beatrix von Storch and Marcus Pretzell, on the other 
hand, were far less inclined to truly criticize the behaviour of the Russian government. 
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Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Von Storch or Pretzell are true Russophiles, instead 
they seem to regard Russia in mostly neutral terms. The reason for the mixed results 
within the AfD will be discussed at length in Chapter 5.  
Based on the party manifestos discussed in the previous chapter, one would 
expect UKIP to be pro-Russian. In fact, this document indicated that Russia was 
perceived as a potential ally, as long as Moscow stopped its aggressive behaviour in its 
near abroad. Clearly, UKIP has not been impressed with the way Russia has been acting 
thus far, as their statements mostly point towards being anti-Russian (coded: Anti-
Russia). Some of these assertions were not overly negative, as they basically stated that 
both the EU and Russia were to blame for the situation in Ukraine. However, a 
declaration by Jonathan Arnott indicated that several UKIP MEPs truly detest Russia’s 
actions. In fact, he asserted that:  
“The actions of Russia have been unacceptable, and it is right that the 
international community should take appropriate and proportionate actions 
such as sanctions (although I do not believe that this should be at EU level – 
rather a matter for individual nations and/or the UN to determine)”. 
 Consequently, it appears like Arnott sided with the EP majority factions in regards to 
this particular issue. In fact, based on the debates, it can be concluded that most UKIP 
members agree with Arnott, and as a result have submitted their own negative 
statements about Russia. These sentiments have become so prevalent among UKIP 
members that only four MEPs, Nigel Farage, Mike Hookem, James Carver and Janice 
Atkinson, can claim somewhat positive remarks about Russia. Yet, even their 
statements appeared rather lukewarm. Indeed, only Nigel Farage was willing to defend 
the Russian state by claiming that:  
“We directly encouraged the uprising in the Ukraine that led to the toppling of 
President Yanukovych; that led in turn to Vladimir Putin reacting; and the 
moral of the story is: if you poke the Russian bear with a stick, do not be 
surprised when he reacts”.  
The other pro-Russian UKIP members may have agreed with the notion that Russia’s 
behaviour in regards to the Ukrainian crisis was provoked by the EU’s aggressive 
conduct. However, they would not go so far as to agree with Farage’s overly positive 
review of the Russian leader. In fact, Nigel Farage was the only one willing to argue 
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that: “Vladimir Putin, whatever we may think of him as a human being, is actually on 
our side”.   
Based on the results, it has become clear that there is a division between UKIP 
(being mostly anti-Russia) and to some extend the AfD, and the rest of the parties in 
this study (ranging from neutral to positive feelings in regards to Russia). Regardless, 
all agreed that the sanctions imposed by the West were problematic and should be lifted 
(coded: Sanctions by the EU). Some MEPs, especially those from the FN, simply 
detested the sanctions as these promoted an anti-Russian stance, and this did not suite 
their pro-Russian rhetoric. The VB, UKIP, and the FPÖ promoted a more pragmatic 
reasoning. Instead, they wished to put an end to the sanctions as it had a negative effect 
on the European producers. By lifting the measures imposed by the EU, the negative 
effect on the European economy could (potentially) be reversed. Finally, a large number 
of MEPs came to protest sanctions which they believed supported the American interest 
as opposed to the European interest. Moreover, the radical right argued that by acting as 
the U.S.’ puppet, EU-Russia relations had been hampered, while at the same time the 
U.S. had been able to strengthen its ties with Russia. 
 
4.2.4 The West 
 Besides positive and negative sentiments related to Russia, these debates also 
included statements on how the West was perceived. Based on the party programs as 
well as the available literature on the subject, one may assume that the parties included 
in this study would negatively look upon the EU. The coded segments retrieved from 
the data clearly communicate the same sentiment, as 138 anti-EU statements (coded: 
Ant-EU) could be found. In fact, all parties appear to agree that the EU was responsible 
for the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and the situation in Crimea. After all, the Union chose 
to act aggressively in a nation where it had no jurisdiction. Additionally, UKIP MEPs 
argued that Russia and Ukraine deserved a significant share of the blame as well.  
 Besides focussing on the violent behaviour of the EU in Ukraine, the radical 
right also extensively criticized the EU for its expansionist tendencies (coded: 
Expansion). All parties in this study are critical of the further widening of this institute, 
and they are especially opposed to policies such as the AA (coded: Association 
Agreement), which they perceive as next step towards EU membership for Ukraine, 
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Moldova, and Georgia. In particularly, UKIP seemed opposed to this proposal as it 
would lead to the further expansion and integration of this moribund Union. In fact, this 
party found the AA so problematic that 10 UKIP MEPs submitted the exact same 
message to the Union: 
“UKIP did not support the ratification of Association Agreements with Ukraine, 
Georgia or Moldova. The signing of these agreements contributed to increased 
tensions between the EU and Russia and contributed to the increased insecurity 
in eastern Europe and the Caucasus. They are also seen as a step towards future 
EU membership. As such we voted against. 
UKIP were however pleased to note that Amendment 17 called for the EU to 
ensure that the upcoming vote in the Netherlands on the EU-Ukraine Agreement 
is respected”. 
Statements such as these, clearly protest the closer relations that started to develop 
between Eastern European states and the Union. After all, the radical right does not 
believe that the EU should help countries as corrupt and unstable as Ukraine, especially 
considering that the EU had its own issues to consider as well. Moreover, while UKIP 
feels comfortable blaming Russia for causing the war in Ukraine, it also believes that 
EU-Russia relations should be stabilized, and according to them this would not prove 
possible if the AA came into being. Other parties in this study also support the notion 
that the AA is anything but beneficial to the Union. However, to them it seems like a 
secondary problem. Instead they opt to generalise the topic, and instead criticize the 
EU’s expansionist tendencies. 
 Finally, the U.S. and its influence on the Crimean crisis should also be 
mentioned. In the segment on party programs it was indicated that the FPÖ and the VB 
perceived the United States negatively, whereas UKIP, Jobbik, and the AfD understood 
the U.S. in opposite terms. Moreover, the FN simply did not indicate an opinion on this 
state in its party manifesto. Thus based on these programs one would expect a diverse 
range of opinions on the U.S. Yet, when the debates are taken into consideration one 
clear pattern started to appear, that of the radical right being opposed to the U.S. The 
main reason for this being that the EU continuously seems to follow and promote 
American interests as opposed to European interests. Harald Vilimsky of the FPÖ goes 
as far as to claim that: “One gets the impression that the majority has become a 
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European embassy of the United States of America, instead of a self-confident 
European Parliament”. Additionally, the radical right was also frustrated that the U.S. 
got involved in this conflict in the first place. Thus, instead of aiming to promote 
international cooperation with the U.S., the radical right simply tired of the state’s 
continuous influence over the EU. This anti-U.S. stance seemed unexpected and 
remarkable to the author, however due to the scope of this project the topic will not be 
addressed in further detail. Consequently, the author would recommend that more 
research is done in order to better understand the relation between the radical right and 
the U.S.  
 
4.3 Voting patterns in the EP 
4.3.1 Votes on the debates 
 In order to better represent the debates discussed in this previous section, several 
voting records on related topics will be analysed. In particularly, the author will be 
looking into the following voting records: Situation in Ukraine (17-07-2014); EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement, with the Exception of the treatment of Third Country 
Nationals Legally Employed as Workers in the Territory of the Other Party (16-09-
2014); State of EU-Russia Relations (10-06-2015); Strategic Military Situation in the 
Black Sea Basin Following the Illegal Annexation of Crimea by Russia (11-06-2015); 
Human Rights Situation in Crimea, in Particular of the Crimean Tatars (04-02-2016); 
Ukrainian Political Prisoners in Russia and Situation in Crimea (16-03-2017) 
(references to these votes will be shortened for the sake of clarity). Considering that all 
these reports are written by Europhile MEPs, the radical right would have to vote 
against (code value of 1) the resolutions in order to vote in a pro-Russian manner. The 
exception to this would be the discussion on the ‘Ukrainian Political Prisoners in Russia 
and Situation in Crimea’, in this case the MEPs would have to either abstain (code value 
of 3) or vote against the resolution in order to support Russia.  In all cases voting in 
favour (code value of 2) of a joint motion for resolution was perceived as pro-EU and 
anti-Russia. Besides voting in favour, against, or abstaining, parliamentarians can also 
be absent (code value of 4), opt to submit no vote (code value of 5), or be on 
documented absence (code value of 6).  
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 Based on the results of these votes (see Appendix 3) it has become clear that 
most MEPs vote along party lines. This conclusion is best suited to MEPs belonging to 
Jobbik, the FPÖ, and the FN, as only one person, Jean-Luc Schaffenhauser, felt the need 
to defect. Thus, based on this information it would seem like these parties are hard-line 
pro-Russia. Nevertheless, it should be noted that most FN members chose to abstain in 
the debate on the Ukrainian Prisoners and the Situation in Crimea. The author still 
perceived this result as pro-Russian, due in part to the large number of radical right 
wing MEPs (within and outside of this study) voting along these lines. However, voting 
against this resolution, as was done by Jobbik and FPÖ MEPs, indicates a stronger pro-
Russian sentiment. A brief overview of the extent to which these parties are pro-Russian 
can be viewed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Votes in Favour of Russia Between 2014-2018 
 
It should be noted that only those MEPs that voted for, against or chose to abstain, were 
included in Figure 3. Data on absence, documented absence, and non-voting may appear 
relevant and is therefore included in Annex 3. However, it does not provide the author 
with any information on the parliamentarians’ perspective of the EU, Russia, Ukraine 
and/or Crimea. Moreover, including said data would only unduly widen the scope of the 
thesis. As a consequence, the author chose to exclude the data. 
The clear exception to this pro-Russian trend is the AfD. This party was initially 
represented by seven MEPs (later onwards by two), and did not appear to vote as a 
 58 
group. In fact, based on the results it would seem like two internal factions came to 
represent the AfD, one that (somewhat) supported Russia and one that favoured the EU 
instead. Hans-Olaf Henkel, Joachim Starbatty, Bernd Lucke, Bernd Kölmel, and Ulrike 
Trebesius, belonged to the latter, and consistently voted in an anti-Russia and pro-EU 
manner. The former grouping was represented by Beatrix von Storch and Marcus 
Pretzell, who were more inclined to vote in favour of Russia. Nevertheless, even these 
two parliamentarians did not consistently vote with the Kremlin in mind. The reasons 
for these trends will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 In a similar vein, the VB also appeared less than consistent in voting in a pro-
Russian manner. Only 67% of the votes casted by the VB, were in favour of the 
Kremlin. However, in this case, the data may be somewhat misleading. After all, Gerolf 
Annemans is the only member of the VB that has made it into the EP. Consequently, it 
becomes difficult to distinguish between an ‘average’ VB vote or one that is purely 
based on Annemans’ perspective. Moreover, whenever Annemans did voted against 
Russia, he did not necessarily vote in favour of the EU either. Instead the MEP opted 
several times to abstain, this was also the case when it did prove beneficial for Russia if 
parliamentarians chose to do so.  
 Unlike the VB and the AfD, UKIP behaves considerably more like the FPÖ, the 
FN, and Jobbik, in that it is likely to vote against resolutions that maintain an accusatory 
tone towards the Russian Federation. This attitude appears rather contradictory when 
compared to the attitude promoted at the time of the debates. That being said, when 
considering the report on the ‘Human rights situation in Crimea, in particular of the 
Crimean Tatars’, the Brits decided to keep with the stance they had advocated during 
the debates, and opted to vote in favour of this resolution. In fact, of those MEPs 
belonging to UKIP, only Tim Aker chose to abstain. Others that did not vote in 
accordance with the pro-Russian stance were Beatrix von Storch of the AfD, who chose 
to vote in favour of this resolution, and Gerolf Annemans opted to abstain. All other 
radical right MEPs included in this study, chose to do the opposite, and voted against 
the resolution. Interestingly enough, all members of the Movimento 5 Stelle, a well-
established Italian radical right party belonging to the same overarching faction as 
UKIP, Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), opted to vote against this 
resolution as well (Shekhovtsov, 2016). Thus, UKIP appears like a true outlier in this 
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case. This result is best seen in Figure 4 below. In addition, this figure also indicates 
which debates were interpreted in the most pro-Russian terms. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of Votes in Favour of Russia, Separated by Debate Between 2014-
2018. 
  
 The voting record on the human rights situation in Crimea clearly indicates that 
radical right parties may have diverging opinions on certain topics. Nevertheless, the 
parties discussed in this thesis have a tendency to vote in a similar pro-Russian manner. 
This is best perceived in the case of the Ukrainian prisoners and the situation in Crimea, 
where 97% of the radical right MEPs voted against the resolution or chose to abstain. 
Besides that, other voting records also show a convincingly pro-Russian trend, as at 
least 89% to 92% of the parliamentarians indicated that they could not support the 
motions for resolutions in the state in which they were presented. That being said, the 
results got slightly diminished due to the MEPs of the AfD and the VB, both of which 
opted to abstain rather frequently. Furthermore, the five members of the AfD mentioned 
previously, can hardly be described as Eurosceptics and/or Russophiles, as they came to 
vote in favour of several resolutions. The reasoning behind this rather pro-European 
outlook will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
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4.3.2 Loyal or Rebellious 
 Besides showing voting patterns, Annex 3 also indicates if a MEP was loyal 
(code value of 1), rebellious (code value of 2), or independent (code value of 3) during 
certain debates. Initially the author expected that the former two values would indicate 
the level of pro-Russianness of a faction. However, the results were not as expected. In 
fact, major problems were caused because of the method used to determine whether a 
party proved loyal or not. Votewatch.eu indicated that “an MEP is considered ‘loyal’ to 
his/her European political group or national party delegation if his/her voting option is 
identical to the political line of the political group or party delegation” (Votewatch.eu, 
n.d.). Thus, being loyal or rebellious says something about whether or not an MEP votes 
in line with the majority of a faction. Thus, even when a party appears to act 
contradictory, they may still be perceived as loyal as long as they have superior 
numbers within their bloc. This is best illustrated in the case of UKIP. In the debate on 
the human rights situation in Crimea almost all members of UKIP voted in favour of 
this proposal, however a significant number of other EFDD members voted against this 
resolution. Still, UKIP MEPs were perceived as loyal, as they took up the majority of 
the seats in their faction. As a result, the political lines of the delegations can become 
tremendously fluid, which makes it difficult, nay impossible, to make any inferences 
about these parties being in favour of or against Russia.   
Even if inferences based on loyalty or rebelliousness were possible, they would 
have been hampered due to other factors. The most important being that not all radical 
right-wing parties decided to join EU factions, such as the EFDD or the Europe of 
Nations and Freedom (ENF). In fact, for some delegations it proved impossible to join 
such groupings, as they were perceived as too radical. However, other parties chose to 
become independent themselves, as was the case with Jobbik. Regardless of how these 
parties came to be independent, their status makes it impossible to make any inferences 
about their loyalty or rebelliousness. That being said, the data in Annex 3 does imply 
that members of Jobbik chose to vote similarly, thus loyalty within the party may be 
presumed. Up to a point, the same can be said for the FN, which also has high levels of 
cohesion. Moreover, like Jobbik, the FN did not belong to a faction for several years. 
However, this changed in 2015, when in June the ENF was established. Nevertheless, 
this move is unlikely to improve the debate on loyalty or rebelliousness. After all, the 
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FN, like UKIP, has become the majority partner within its faction. Thus, as long as 
most FN MEPs vote similarly they will appear loyal.  
Finally, not all radical right-wing parties opted to join a Eurosceptic faction 
within the EU. Instead, some chose to join a mainstream affiliation. Among my case 
studies, this phenomenon is best illustrated by the AfD, which used to partner with the 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). Consequently, if MEPs voted in a pro-
Russian manner, they would likely be qualified as rebellious as they went against their 
faction’s interest. After considering all issues concerning principles of loyalty and 
rebelliousness, the author has decided to exclude this topic from the discussion segment 
of this thesis. That being said, finding better ways to represent the loyal or rebelling 
attitude of these (radical) factions might prove an interesting topic for further research.   
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5. DISCUSSION 
  
5.1 The radical right as pro-Russian actors 
 Based on the results discussed in Chapter 4, it has become clear that at least part 
of the radical right has come to promote pro-Russian sentiments through its party 
programs, parliamentary debates, and through voting results. The FN, the FPÖ and 
Jobbik strongly argued in favour of improving relations with Russia. The VB, however, 
pursued a more neutral approach, they believed that sanctions were harmful to European 
citizens and industries, and should thus be lifted. Finally, both the AfD and UKIP 
indicated mixed feelings about Russia. On the one hand their party manifestos indicated 
that relations with Russia were desirable. On the other hand, the debates and the votes 
took on a less than positive stance. In fact, statements issued by UKIP in the EP took on 
a hostile tone. While these results may have provided the reader with a good overview 
of how the radical right perceives Russia, it has not become clear if these favourable 
and negative stances towards Russia are a recent phenomenon or if they have their roots 
in the past. In the next few paragraphs the author will discuss the radical right’s (new) 
external dimension, in order to answer the first research question: 
R1: To what extend is the pro-Russian sentiment a new external dimension of 
the radical right? 
 
 Based on the party manifestos which were published between 2014 and 2017, 
several parties indicated that relations between Russia and their respective nation-state 
should be improved. This with the exception of the FN and VB, who did not provide 
any stance on Russia through these documents. The FPÖ took on a mostly neutral 
stance. They specifically indicated that Austria, and not the EU, should be able to make 
their own decisions in regards to Russia. Consequently, based on this document it 
remains unclear whether or not the FPÖ wants relations to improve or deteriorate. The 
party programs published by the AfD, Jobbik and UKIP are significantly more 
transparent about their stances towards Russia, which are largely positive. However, in 
the case of Jobbik this does not appear to be a new external dimension. As mentioned 
previously, the party program published in 2010 also had to be considered, and this 
document indicated a similar positive stance towards the Russian Federation. Thus, 
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Jobbik could have become Russia’s bedfellow before any of the other parties included 
in this study. While this is not directly proven by my results, this attitude is shared by 
the Political Capital Institute. In 2014 they published an article called “The Russian 
Connection”, in which they proclaimed that Eastern European radical right-wing 
parties, such as Jobbik, Attack (Bulgaria), and the Slovak National Party (SNS), were 
among the first parties to openly support Vladimir Putin. Indeed, according to this 
article (Political Capital Institute, 2014) their pro-Russian attitudes precede the 
Ukrainian crisis and already became apparent in the late 2000s. Moreover, it has been 
argued that the East used to be Russia’s main bedfellow until the Western parties came 
to consider the Russian position during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 (Political Capital 
Institute, 2014). However, a quick search into older party programs by the author, did 
indicate that at least the FN already had some opinions on the Russian Federation in 
2012 (Front National, 2012). Nevertheless, due to the scope of this research project, 
these documents cannot be considered in detail, so inferences can hardly be made. 
Nevertheless, one might expect these major power to at least consider bilateral 
cooperation. In the case of the AfD, the FPÖ, and UKIP, the Russian angle seems to be 
of a more recent nature, as this particular state was not mentioned in previous party 
programs. The VB provides least information as Russia is neither mentioned in recent 
nor somewhat older party programs. It should be noted that the author only considered 
the second most recent party programs to base these inferences on. Thus, for a better 
overview on stances on Russia, party programs encompassing a longer period of time 
need to be taken into account. Yet, this was outside of the scope of this thesis. 
 The debates and votes that were held between 2014 and the end of 2017, clearly 
indicate that Russia has entered the external dimension of the radical right. Regardless 
of their opinion on Russia, most MEPs have made an effort to either praise or criticize 
this state. In fact, only 10 MEPs did not respond to any of the debates covered in this 
thesis. All others included at least one statement in regards to Russia. Some, such as 
James Carver and Jean-Luc Schaffenhauser, appeared more enthusiastic and responded 
to multiple debates. Yet, the fact that these MEPs are willing to discuss Russia in the EP 
says more about the roles they are playing within the parliament, then the extent to 
which Russia is a new foreign policy angle. Nevertheless, the manner through which the 
radical right has presented itself might have caused the Russian agenda to increase in 
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salience. Research by Natalie Brack (2015b) indicates that there are four types of 
MEPs: the absentee, the public orator, the pragmatist, and the participant. The MEPs 
included in this study are pragmatists at best, and absentees at worst. However, the 
author expects that most would fall into the category of the public orator. This because 
the MEPs in my sample appear to closely align themselves with the two main purposes 
of the public orator. Firstly, he or she uses the EP as a platform for public speaking. 
Secondly, he or she aims to spread negative information on the EU as well as on other 
issues. In fact, one anonymous MEP claimed that: “I am not here [in the EP] to help this 
thing exist, I am to criticize, criticize, criticize” (Brack, 2015b, p.341). Thus, whenever 
the EU brought up Russia’s behaviour in regards to the Ukrainian crisis, it seemed like 
the perfect opportunity to call out the Union on its biased position regarding Russia. 
This logic worked best in light of the Crimean crisis, as this event signified that Russia 
had finally become one of the Unions main adversaries. However, this rationale might 
have also worked in the past. Yet in order to make such inferences one would have to 
analyse whether or not Russia was already perceived as the EU’s antagonist in seventh 
term (which lasted from 2009 until 2014). While an interesting research avenue, it is 
outside of the scope of this thesis. That being said, research by Marlene Laruelle (2015) 
suggests that promoting a pro-Russian stance is a somewhat recent phenomenon. After 
all, Putin was not able to conflate “Russophilia and Euroscepticism as two sides of the 
same coin” (Laruelle, 2015, p.4) until he came back to power in 2012. As a result, it 
simply does not seem logical that the majority of radical right-wing parties came to 
support Russia before that, or even before the Crimean crisis. 
 All in all, it can be concluded that pro-Russian and/or anti-Russian stances are a 
recent phenomenon for most parties included in this study. The clear exception to this is 
Jobbik. In fact, this party might be able to claim that Russophilia is inherent to their 
party. After all, their party programs have indicated that closer relations between 
Hungary and Russia are perceived as desirable. In particularly, Jobbik wishes to 
facilitate a bridge between the East and the West. The other parties discussed in this 
thesis cannot claim such goals. Moreover, their stances towards Russia, as perceived 
through the debates, votes, and/or party programs, appear to be of a more recent nature, 
and have a tendency to specifically focus on the Ukrainian crisis. Thus, this begs the 
question if foreign policy perspectives on Russia will change significantly or simply 
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cease to exist once the conflict in Ukraine is settled. While it is currently impossible to 
answer this question, it might prove interesting to do so if or when the crisis gets 
resolved.   
 
5.2 The manifestation of pro-Russian sentiments among the radical right 
 According to the literature discussed in Chapter 1, there are several reasons why 
the radical right may have started to cooperate with Russia. While Klapsis (2015) 
argued that this connection could come into existence based on a shared ideological 
connection, Polyakova et al. (2016) directed attention towards the positive effects of 
having economic relations with Russia. Besides that, Rohac, Zgut, and Györi (2017) 
argued that relations between the radical right and Russia could prove beneficial to 
both, as they tend to fight the same enemies: the EU and other Western institutions. 
While all these arguments prove interesting and logical in their own right, most do not 
consider the effects of foreign policies on radical right-Russia relations. In order to gain 
a better understanding on pro-Russian sentiments, and how these manifested as a 
consequence of the external dimension, the following question was asked: 
R2: How do pro-Russian sentiments manifest themselves through the radical 
right’s foreign policy perspectives, party manifestos, parliamentary debates, and 
voting results? 
Before starting the discussion on how these pro-Russian sentiments manifested, it has to 
be (re)emphasized that not every party included in this study agrees that Russia should 
be perceived favourably. Especially UKIP and the AfD would disagree with this notion. 
Their attitudes towards the Russian Federation, and how these came to be, will be 
analysed in the next sub-chapter. This specific segment will solely focus on how 
positive sentiments in regards to Russia manifested themselves through the external 
dimension.  
 Regardless of what the radical right thinks about Russia and/or the Russian 
leadership, there appears to be one thing that they can all agree on; the EU or individual 
Member States should have strong economic relations with Russia. Even though some 
parties are highly critical of Russia’s behaviour during the Ukrainian war, all believe 
that sanctions by the EU should be lifted or at least lowered. Moreover, if the EU 
remains unwilling to accommodate this point of view, then it cannot be expected that 
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Russia will ends its sanctions either. Nevertheless, if the EU is willing to adjust its 
stance on the economic and diplomatic measures, then, according to the radical right, 
EU-Russia relations might normalize. This stance is commonly promoted among those 
that perceive Russia favourably such as the FPÖ and the FN, as both feel that their 
respective nation-states could benefit from cooperation with Russia. However, even 
those that are more critical towards Russia support the idea that trade can only benefit 
the EU, individual states, and EU citizens. This is best seen through the case of Beatrix 
von Storch, an AfD MEP, who stated that: “[…] we should aim for free trade with 
Russia. Because, where goods cross the border, armies will not do so”. According to 
Von Storch, economic relations with Russia should be perceived as a suitable foreign 
policy option, as it could lead to the stabilization of Eastern Europe. Additionally, 
MEPs from the VB and FPÖ tend to argue in favour of trade relations with Russia as 
well, because specific Austrian and Belgian sectors stand to benefit from it. While their 
arguments prioritize the national sphere, it also suites the pro-Russian angle which the 
FPÖ in particularly promotes. Regardless of their overall motivation, the radical right 
has intentionally or accidentally come to support Russia. An article published by 
Polyakova et al. (2016) follows a similar line of reasoning. However, these scholars add 
that some nation-states may already expect to have economic relations with Russia. For 
example, both the UK and France have a long standing tradition of trading with Russia, 
consequently desiring economic relations with this state might not be unique to the 
radical right (Polyakova et al., 2016). That being said, the radical right may be more 
committed to supporting these relations in light of Russia’s aggressive behaviour, 
compared to the more mainstream parties.  
 Another way that pro-Russian sentiments manifested themselves was through 
what Laruelle (2015, p.4) calls the ‘equation of Russophilia and Euroscepticism’. Since 
the early 1990s the EU has been treated with a certain degree of scepticism. Over the 
years, as the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties were introduced, this sentiment only 
strengthened. In fact, in light of these accords, the radical right came to believe that the 
EU had become entirely too powerful. After all, the EU repeatedly took sovereignty 
away from the state and acted aggressively in conflicts not their own. Not only that, but 
this institution also continuously promoted an expansionist agenda. The latter point was 
perceived as especially problematic, because the radical right felt that the Union should 
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first and foremost focus on its many internal issues, as opposed to adding more 
(corrupt) states into the Union. However, the EU is not the only one who was perceived 
negatively; indeed, the United States has been stigmatized as well. This mostly because 
the radical right believes that this actor has gained too much sway over the EU. 
Moreover, during the debates on the Ukrainian crisis, it became clear that the radical 
right had never wanted the U.S. to get involved in this conflict in the first place. Now 
that the radical right truly opposed both the EU as well as the rest of the Western world, 
they felt that there was nothing left to do but finding a new ally elsewhere. Immediately, 
several radical right-wing parties turned towards the East, where they quickly 
established relations with the Russian Federation. Works by Klapsis (2015) and 
Larrabee et al. (2017) indicate that this move Eastwards could correspond with the 
radical right’s desire to find a geopolitical alternative to the West. While the radical 
right has clearly called for the improvement of relations with Russia, the author doubts 
that this was done with the purpose of finding a political alternative. Moreover, while 
the radical right might wish to rid themselves of Western influences, the coded 
segments on geopolitical alternatives do not suggest that they aim to defer to Russia 
instead. That being said, both Russia and the radical right are willing to form bilateral 
and multilateral alliances in order to further their relation. In particularly, Russia desires 
to cooperate through partnerships such as the Berlin-Paris-Moscow Triangle and a 
‘Europe of Nations’ (Laruelle, 2015, p.3). Moscow’s stance must have been perceived 
favourably, as radical right-wing MEPs have also started to mention the concept of a 
‘Europe of Nations’ or a ‘Europe of Fatherlands’ as a replacement alliance for the EU. 
Thus, by criticizing the West and following Russia’s lead, a pro-Russian and anti-
EU/anti-U.S. attitude was able to manifest. 
 The Ukrainian crisis, in particularly the Crimean annexation, has also led the 
radical right to express positive stances towards Russia. In particularly, the radical right 
intended to use this crisis in order to press two points. Firstly, Russia should be 
perceived as a strategic partner, and not as an antagonist. Secondly, the Russia 
Federation had justly intervened in its near abroad. This latter point was repeatedly 
brought up in relation to the social anxiety which affected both Eastern Ukraine and the 
Crimean Peninsula. The radical right had believed this situation to be so dire that it 
could have harmed the Russian nation-state and its citizens as well. Consequently, 
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intervening seemed like the only option. Additionally, Sophie Montel, a former FN 
member, maintains that Russia’s interest in the region is only logical, after all “the 
natural location of these states is in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood”. On top of that, 
the radical right claimed that the Crimean population itself had chosen to (re)join the 
Russian Federation through a democratic referendum. Even though most Western 
politicians have described this referendum as anything but legal, the radical right insists 
that this vote was an expression of the free will of the Crimean people. Additionally, the 
radical right could have further legitimized this referendum by stating that a significant 
number of them had been asked to monitor this event (Shekhovtsov, 2014). In fact, Béla 
Kovács of Jobbik, Aymeric Chauprade a former FN member, as well as several national 
VB and FPÖ members, made their way to Crimea to check on the validity of the 
referendum (Shekhovtsov, 2014, n.p.). In doing so, they felt like they could characterise 
this event as free, fair, and legitimate. Besides the Crimean crisis, the Russo-Georgian 
war also tended to be brought up with the purpose to legitimize Russia’s behaviour. 
This specific conflict was mentioned on multiple occasions, as it shows that the EU 
frequently blames Russia for conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood. Even though, a 
report by Heidi Tagliavini, a Swiss Diplomate, demonstrates that the Georgian state 
should be held accountable instead. Thus, by bringing up this conflict, the radical right 
hints at the EU’s previous mistakes.   
 It can be concluded that pro-Russian sentiments manifested themselves through 
a number of different routes. Some of these, such as having economic relations with 
Russia, can be perceived as rather pragmatic instead of purely pro-Russian in nature. 
After all, these policies tend to be implemented with the goal to improve the national 
economy and industry. Thus, some radical right parties may come to promote economic 
relations with Russia as this best suits their respective states, and not because it would 
indicate any sort of positive regard towards Russia. Bearing this in mind, the author 
does acknowledge that this form of cooperation likely pleases the Russian Federation. 
Additionally, Russia has worked hard to equate the pro-Russian stance with an anti-EU 
one. The radical right clearly supports this rhetoric as they tend to criticize the Union, 
while applauding Russia at the same time. Finally, those radical right parties that 
reacted positively to Russia, have started to use referendums as well as the principle of 
self-determination, to justify Putin’s behaviour abroad.  
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5.3 Different and similar patterns of being pro-Russian 
 It has become evident that parties such as the FN, the FPÖ, and Jobbik have 
come to strongly support the Russian Federation. The VB has taken a more neutral 
stance, but may be willing for pragmatic reasons to support Russia. Finally, the AfD 
and UKIP have opted for a more varied approach in regards to Russia. Both have used 
their party programs to argue that they are (somewhat) in favour of relations with 
Russia. UKIP’s votes also appeared to favour the Russian state, but these are likely 
more Eurosceptic in nature (see sub-chapter 5.3.3 for a further explanation). 
Comparatively, the AfD appears less sympathetic through their votes, as only 28% of 
these can be perceived as pro-Russian. During the debates the AfD and UKIP became 
even less supportive of Russia’s behaviour. As a matter of fact, both started to 
characterise Russia as an aggressive actor and put part of the blame for the situation in 
Ukraine on this state. Based on these responses, it has become clear that the AfD and 
UKIP follow a more anti-Russia pattern, as opposed to Jobbik, the FPÖ, the FN, and to 
some extend the VB who all perceive Russia at least neutrally, but more likely, 
favourably. In the next few paragraphs explanations will be provided for these 
distinctive behavioural patterns, this with the purpose of answering the last research 
question: 
R3: What explains the similar/different patterns of pro-Russian sentiments in the 
radical right?  
 
5.3.1 Neutral Russia and pro-Russia: The FN, the FPÖ, Jobbik, and the VB 
 It cannot be denied that the FN, the FPÖ and Jobbik have come to strongly 
support the Russian Federation. In fact, through their voting patterns as well as through 
the debates, similar stances emerge on topics such as the EU, the U.S., Ukraine, and 
Russia. This mostly due to the fact, that all used the same arguments to justify their 
relations with Russia. Nevertheless, their pro-Russian attitude does not seem as well 
matched when one solely compares their party manifestos. Jobbik, as one of Russia’s 
earliest bedfellows, provided a favourable description of Russia in both its 2010 and 
2014 party programs. The FPÖ on the other hand took on a more neutral approach, 
whereas the FN simply did not mention the Russian Federation in this document. Yet, 
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does this truly signify that these parties portray different patterns of pro-Russianness. 
The author does not think so. Take the FPÖ for example, this party formally maintained 
the same party program from 1997 until 2011 (Heinisch & Hauser, 2016, p.79). Even 
though their manifesto may not have changed, the same cannot be said for the party’s 
foreign policy perspectives. Indeed, over the years the FPÖ, like Jobbik, might have 
developed a particular stance on Russia, yet this sentiment simply could not have been 
represented in this static document. Therefore, it might prove more insightful to discuss 
the radical rightist stances on Russia through the debates and votes. These statements 
and votes, like the manifestos, only apply to a distinct topic at a specific point in time, 
but by comparing multiple statements, pro-Russian and/or anti-Russian patterns may 
become apparent. As mentioned previously, similar pro-Russian stances quickly became 
noticeable among the FN, the FPÖ and Jobbik once the debates and votes were taken 
into consideration. Thus, while these party programs should be perceived as insightful 
in their own right, they may not lend themselves well for forming patterns. Instead, the 
author decided to mostly focus on the results from the votes and debates to establish 
these. All in all, the author believes that similar patterns came into existence regarding 
the FN, the FPÖ and Jobbik, as all used the same pragmatic and Eurosceptic arguments 
to indicate their Russophilia. Moreover, they also reshaped the narrative around the 
Crimean annexation in order to portray Russia favourably.  
 The VB fits a slightly different pattern than the parties mentioned above. This is 
mostly because the VB provides a mix of both neutral and positive responses in regards 
to Russia. In the same vein, it proves difficult to establish a pattern that truly matches 
the VB’s stances towards this state. This issue is not helped by the fact that this case 
suffers from a lack of information. Currently, the VB is only represented by one MEP, 
Gerolf Annemans, meaning that his opinion has come to represent the entire VB. This 
would not necessarily be overly problematic, were it not for his absentee tendencies 
(Brack, 2015b). Clearly, Annemans does not wish to get involved in the EP debates, as 
only one statement in regards to Russia could be found. This statement was not nearly 
as positive as those submitted by the FPÖ, the FN, and Jobbik. That being said, 
Annemans did indicate that sanctions against Russia should be lifted. Yet, he only 
appears to support this stance because it would prove beneficial for European farmers. 
Results on the votes appear slightly more insightful, as he voted on all motions for 
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resolution. However, yet again a mixed record of both neutral and pro-Russian 
responses becomes apparent. All in all, the author would argue that the VB subscribes 
mostly neutral feelings towards Russia. However, pragmatic reasons, such as benefiting 
from trade with Russia, might persuade the VB to become more pro-Russia. That being 
said, this argument would definitely benefit from additional information.  
 
5.3.1 Pro-Russia, anti-Russia, or neutral towards Russia: The AfD 
It has previously been noted that the AfD has portrayed some mixed results in 
regards to Russia. On the one hand their latest party program indicated that “the 
relationship with Russia is of prime importance, because European security cannot be 
attained without Russia’s involvement. Therefore, we strive for a peaceful solution of 
conflicts in Europe, whilst respecting the interest of all parties” (Alternative für 
Deutschland, 2016, p.30). On the other hand, when looking into the results of the votes 
and debates, the AfD did not seem nearly as favourable towards this state. The voting 
records clearly show this negative stance, as 72% of the votes can be perceived as anti-
Russia or pro-EU. But even more importantly, during the debates it became clear that 
several AfD members continue to blame Russia for the Ukrainian crisis, the Crimean 
annexation, and the violence and instability that still plague the Ukrainian state. 
Even though this behaviour may appear contradictory, there are several reasons 
that explain this pro/anti-Russian pattern. When the AfD entered the EP in 2014, the 
party was able to introduce seven MEPs, who mainly focussed on representing their 
national-conservative and Eurosceptic agenda (Decker, 2017). In particularly, the AfD 
became known for criticizing the Eurozone, which was believed to hamper the German 
economy. Especially, Bernd Lucke, Joachim Starbatty, Bernd Kölmel, Ulrike Trebesius 
and Hans-Olaf Henkel passionately represented these issues. Additionally, in 2014 and 
2015 the AfD was affiliated with the ECR. While this group was and remains critical of 
the direction that the EU is going to, it cannot be said that they are hard Eurorejects. 
Thus, even if anti-EU sentiments were promoted on a local and national level, most 
AfD members did not want to promote these at the EU level, as this would be a conflict 
of interest. In the same vein, pro-Russian sentiments simply did not fit in with the 
general direction that the AfD was going in. As a matter of fact, pro-Russian sentiments, 
as later onwards advocated by Marcus Pretzell and Beatrix von Storch, simply did not 
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seem to fit in with the party’s rhetoric in the early 2010s (Alternative für Deutschland, 
2016; Alternative für Deutschland, 2013). Thus, it appears rather logical that a pro-
Russian sentiment did not become noticeable until at least 2016, when the angle was 
first introduced within a party program.  
 While most MEPs felt hesitant and unwilling to criticize the EU, members like 
Beatrix von Storch and Marcus Pretzell felt no such trepidation. Indeed, they regularly 
came to vote against EU proposals. At the same time their orientation towards Russia 
started to take on a more neutral character, after all a vote against the EU could be 
interpreted as a vote in favour of Russia. Truly positive statements were introduced as 
well, but this happened only after Bernd Lucke and his supporters split with the party. 
Finally, pro-Russian statements increased in number in 2015, when Frauke Petry, the 
new leader of the AfD, started to prioritize Euroscepticism as well as EU-Russia 
relations. That being said, the AfD never became as pro-Russian as the FN or the FPÖ, 
as even their most radical members could not always justify Russia’s behaviour in its 
near abroad. 
 
5.3.3 Anti-Russia, pro-Russia, or both: UKIP 
The case of UKIP is somewhat similar to the AfD, in that both parties appear to 
encourage relations with Russia through their party programs. That being said, UKIP 
already appeared somewhat more sceptical, and indicated that it would only support the 
Russian Federation as long as it would stop manipulating Western states (UK 
Independence Party, 2017; see Figure 2 in Chapter 4). If one were to only consider the 
voting records, it would seem like UKIP was pleased with the progress that Russia 
made. After all, 83% of the votes indicated that Russia was perceived favourably (see 
Figure 5 in Chapter 4). The exception to these positive sentiments was the joint motion 
for resolution on the human rights situation in Crimea, here most UKIP MEPs came to 
vote in favour of this resolution, and thus voted in an anti-Russian manner. This specific 
resolution condemned the “unprecedented levels of human rights abuses perpetrated 
against Crimean residents, most notably Crimean Tatars” (2016/2556(RSP), n.p.). 
Besides that, the document also indicated that the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula 
by Russia remains illegal, and that the EU continues to support the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine (2016/2556(RSP)). It seems interesting that UKIP would 
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vote in favour a resolution that promotes these points, as they had previously voted 
against resolutions that brought up similar arguments. Nevertheless, Anton Shekhovtsov 
(2016) notes that the number of ‘against votes’ appear to have decreased over time, and 
that UKIP might be a supporter of this trend. In particularly, Shekhovtsov argues that: 
“In comparison to the previous EP vote on Russia ("State of EU-Russia 
relations"), the share of the "against" votes decreased from 19% to 14%. […] 
This means that fewer MEPs are now ready to remain favourable to, or 
uncritical of, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy” (Shekhovtsov, 2016, n.p.).  
That being said, UKIP returned to voting in a pro-Russian manner during the next vote 
on the Ukrainian political prisoners (see Annex 2). Thus, while parties may have 
become more critical, some remain or return to voting in favour of Russia. 
 Even though UKIP mostly maintains a pro-Russian stance through its voting 
pattern and party program, the results from the debates indicate an entirely different 
sentiment. During these debates, a large number of UKIP MEPs called out Putin on his 
aggressive behaviour in Ukraine. Furthermore, the party agrees with the EU that the 
Crimean annexation remains illegal and that it cannot be justified by referencing 
principles of self-determination or by referring an unjust referendum. As mentioned 
before, these harsh criticisms towards Russia can be justified through UKIP’s party 
manifesto, which indicated that Russia would have to change its aggressive and 
manipulative behaviour in order to (re)establish relations with the United Kingdom. 
Clearly Russia has not changed, so this begs the question why the votes remain 
positively oriented towards this actor. The author would argue that these votes have 
more to do with UKIP’s stance toward the EU as opposed to Russia. After all, UKIP is 
a hard-line Euroreject, so it seems logical that they would use their votes to protest the 
Union. The fact that these votes might benefit Russia is of course undesirable, but 
remains mostly irrelevant as long as the EU gets to be criticized. In light of this 
reasoning UKIPs behaviour during both the debates and votes makes sense. However, 
further research on UKIPs contradictory behaviour might prove beneficial.  
 Interestingly enough, research by Polyakova et al. (2016) indicates that UKIP 
has become a strong supporter of the Russian state. In fact, these scholars argued that 
members of UKIP are trying to hold the EU accountable for the Ukrainian crisis. 
Moreover, these MEPs also apparently alleged that Russia should have every right to 
 74 
intervene in its near abroad (Polyakova et al., 2016, p.22). While the author can 
understand why UKIP’s votes could be interpreted as pro-Russian, the same cannot be 
said for the statements issued during the debates. The majority clearly did not hesitate to 
blame Russia for the social unrest in the region. Indeed, only four MEPs did not share 
this stance, and instead promoted a more neutral or somewhat positive attitude towards 
Russia (see Chapter 4). Thus, based on my data, UKIP cannot be described as a pro-
Russian actor. Instead, the author would argue that some individual UKIP members 
may be willing to support the Russian agenda, yet these seem to be a clear minority 
within their party.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The radical right’s external dimension has largely been neglected from the scholarly 
perspective. Instead, scholars within this field (see for example Mudde, 2007; 
Vasilipolou, 2009; Brack 2015a; Brack 2015b) deemed it more relevant to discuss 
conceptual issues as well as the reasons why people opt to vote for this party family. 
However, over the last decade or so, radical right-wing parties have become 
increasingly popular, and consequently have become better represented at the local, 
national, and EU level. Thus in order to acknowledge this shift, it might prove 
worthwhile to analyse the radical right’s foreign policy perspectives as well. The 
scholarship within this field appears to agree with this notion, as a large number of 
books and articles has been published on the relation between far-right parties and the 
EU. Based on the literature, as well as the data represented in this thesis, it has become 
clear that the radical right perceives the Union as its main antagonist. Issues such as 
expansionism, a lack of democratic principles, and the deterioration of sovereignty, are 
frequently cited among the radical right to justify their hatred for this Western 
institution. While the literature proved beneficial, in that it increased the information on 
the radical right and its foreign policy perspectives, it only took one specific part of the 
external dimension into account. Over the last couple of years, some scholars such as 
Klapsis (2015), Mudde (2014), Polyakova et al. (2016), Larrabee et al. (2017), and 
Laruelle (2015) have made an effort to include another angle; that of the radical right’s 
stance towards the Russian Federation. While a valuable addition to the radical right 
scholarship, very few conclusive remarks can be found and a large number of questions 
remain unanswered. This thesis sought to shed light on three such questions. First of all, 
to what extent are pro-Russian sentiments a new angle of the radical right’s external 
dimension. Second, how have these sentiments manifested themselves. Finally, what 
explains the similar and/or different pro-Russian patterns. By answering these 
questions, the author hoped to contribute to the growing body of literature on the radical 
right, its external dimension, and its stance towards Russia.  
 The findings of this thesis suggest, with respect to the radical rightist stance on 
Russia, that there is no unified manner through which this party family perceives this 
state. The data indicated that most parties belonging to the radical right are willing to 
provide an opinion on the Russian Federation either through their party manifestos, or 
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through the EP debates and votes. Jobbik appeared especially keen on supporting 
Russia, and promoted Russophilia through all analysed mediums. Moreover, it could be 
argued that Jobbik has the longest history of being Russia’s bedfellow. Most other 
parties included in this study, started to include Russia in their foreign policy 
perspectives somewhat more recently, mostly in response to the Ukrainian crisis. That 
being said, Russia has always been a great power, thus it would not be all that surprising 
if parties indicated a strong desire for improved economic and/or security relations. 
Regardless, further research on the Russian angle, and when it first started to appear on 
the radical right’s foreign policy agenda would prove beneficial, as this could lead to 
greater insights on the salience of these relations. 
When solely analysing party manifestos, Russia is mostly perceived in 
favourable or neutral terms. While no negative sentiments can be found, both the VB 
and FN chose to withhold their stances on this nation-state. In regards to the votes and 
debates that took place within the EP, results are far more mixed. In fact, several parties 
included in this study, mostly notably the AfD and UKIP, were highly critical of 
Russia’s behaviour. This mostly because Russia continued to meddle in affairs not its 
own, which neither party was able to justify. The VB promoted a more neutral stance. 
However, this neutral pattern may be due more to a lack of information than anything 
else. All other parties included in this study, the FN, FPÖ, and Jobbik, came to support 
Russia through three different manners. Firstly, these radical right-wing parties came to 
promote economic relations with Russia, as this would prove beneficial to their 
respective nation-states. Secondly, Euroscepticism was equated to Russophilia, as this 
enabled the radical right to try and delegitimise the EU, while also promoting good 
relations with a (potential) ally. Thirdly, the narrative around the Crimean crisis was 
reshaped, so that the radical right could justify Russia’s acts in its near abroad.  
Based on the previous paragraph, it has become clear that at least three to four 
patterns, are needed to describe the full range of radical right-Russia relations. Firstly, 
the FN, the FPÖ, and Jobbik can be grouped together, as they used the same types of 
motives to promote the Russian agenda. This became especially clear through the votes 
and debates, where a great level of cohesion could be perceived. Secondly, a neutral 
pattern was necessary to describe the connection between the VB and Russia. While this 
particular pattern might be applicable to other parties not included in this study, it was 
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mostly applied to the VB due to a lack of information. Finally, the AfD and UKIP 
became known for their respective anti-Russian patterns. Despite some similarities, the 
author believes that two distinctive patterns are necessary to describe the relationship 
between these parties and Russia, as one simply would not be able to do it justice. After 
all, the AfD mostly came to reject Russia due to a lack of Eurosceptic MEPs. Whereas, 
UKIP actively chose to criticize Russia’s aggressive behaviour in Crimea and Ukraine. 
While these four patterns suit the parties included in this study, more research is 
necessary in order to determine if these patterns are also applicable to other radical right 
parties, or if others need to be developed.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
No. Code label Sub-code label Description of code Example quote 
No. of 
coded 
segments 
1. Pro-Russia 
 
Russia is perceived (1) positively or 
(2) as the victim of EU aggression 
"Recall once more that Russia is not an 
adversary and even less an enemy of the 
European nations." 47 
2. 
 
Neutral Russia 
Russia is perceived as a neutral 
actor. 
"Whether we like it or not, the natural 
location of these states is in Russia's 
immediate neighbourhood." 15 
3. 
 
Anti-Russia 
Russia is perceived (1) negatively or 
(2) as the aggressor in this conflict. 
"The actions of Russia have been 
unacceptable, and it is right that the 
international community should take 
appropriate and proportionate actions 
such as sanctions […]". 22 
4. 
 
EU Resolutions 
The EU motions for resolutions are 
perceived negatively, as they tend to 
be unbalanced, subjective, and one-
sided. 
"Similar to the report on Russia, this 
resolution is unbalanced and one-sided, 
and seeks the solution of this crisis 
exclusively on the Russian side.' 65 
5. 
 
Geopolitical alternative 
A country or region is presented as a 
geopolitical alternative to the EU 
and/or U.S. This alternative can be 
Russia, but does not have to be.  
"This is a grave political mistake: it is 
advisable to positively perceive the 
accession into a multipolar world, a world 
in which France and Europe would no 
longer be subjected to great foreign 
powers." 8 
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6. 
 
Economic relations with 
Russia 
Either that (1) the EU is suffering 
due to the broken economic 
relations with Russia (due to 
sanctions) or (2) that trade with 
Russia would be beneficial. 
"Whether we like it or not, the natural 
location of these states is in Russia's 
immediate neighbourhood." 12 
7. 
 
Sanctions by Russia 
Sanctions imposed by Russia 
against the EU are perceived as a 
responds to EU sanctions and thus 
justifiable. 
"The outcry has been huge in the EU, 
since the Russian side has revealed a list 
banning individual’s entry into Russia. 
But, it must be clear to everyone that 
Russia would respond with similar 
counter-measures to the West's entry 
bans. 7 
8. 
 
Positive relations 
Refers to (1) the positive relation 
between the EU and Russia, or (2) 
that these should be improved. 
"It is time, that part of the EU seeks 
dialogue with Russia and approaches this 
with a healthy measure of willingness to 
compromise." 32 
9. 
 
Negative relations 
 Refers to (1) the negative relation 
between the EU and Russia, or (2) 
that these have been deteriorating. 
Regardless, Russia is always 
perceived as favourably or neutrally. 
When Russia is perceived 
negatively it is coded as Anti-
Russia. 
"When it comes to the situation in 
Ukraine and the relations with Russia, 
Russia is automatically assigned all the 
blame." 49 
10. 
 
Self-determination 
Refers to the fact that the Crimean 
population chose to join Russia. 
Perceived in positive terms. 
"The EU, true to itself, denies democracy 
and the right of people to self-
determination." 21 
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11. 
 
Democratic referendum 
References to the democratic 
referendum that took place on the 
16th of March 2014 on Crimea. 
Perceived in positive terms.  
"A free, fair and democratic referendum 
is a legitimate expression of the will of 
the people of a state or region." 20 
12. 
 
Russo-Georgia war 
General references to the Russo-
Georgia war of 2008. Used as an 
example for cases were Russia was 
undeservedly given the blame.  
"The Russian Federation is effectively 
accused of all evils: the outbreak of the 
war against Georgia, yet an independent 
international commission gave the 
responsibility to Tbilisi." 10 
 
 
13. 
 
Kosovo conflict 
General references to Kosovo 
declaring independence, this is 
perceived as a precedent for the 
Crimean case. 
"Moreover, international law provides 
several precedents, where states achieved 
independence, e.g. Kosovo." 
4 
 
14.  ‘Illegal' Crimean annexation 
The term 'illegal' is mentioned in the 
context of the Crimean annexation. 
The radical right is critical of the 
usage of this word. 
"It speaks clearly about the illegal 
annexation of Crimea, although this is 
controversial under international law." 16 
15. Anti-EU 
 
The EU is (1) perceived negatively, 
or (2) as the aggressor of this 
conflict. 
"I have to wonder if we do not already 
have enough problems in the European 
Union in its current form." 137 
16. 
 
Pro-Europe 
Europe (the continent and its 
culture) is perceived positively; also 
includes mentions of a "Europe of 
Nations". 
"European culture has been constructed 
on three pillars: Greek thinking, Roman 
law, and Christian morality. As 
jobbikosok […], we believe, not only that 
Europe's past has been founded on these 
values, but also that its future should 
continue to be." 18 
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17. 
 
United States of Europe 
The EU is likened to a superstate 
and/or empire. This is perceived 
negatively.  
"We reject the idea of a United States of 
Europe, as well as that of a federal state 
from which an exit is impossible." 20 
18. 
 
Expansion 
The (further) widening of the EU 
through including more nation-states 
into the Union. This code is not used 
when there are references to the AA, 
instead see code: Association 
Agreement. 
"My colleagues from the Front National 
and I, are categorically opposed to the 
further enlargement f this moribund 
Union." 46 
19. 
 
Sovereignty (to the EU) 
The state loses out on sovereignty as 
it is transferred to the EU 
(competence creep). This is 
perceived negatively. 
"Furthermore, this report surreptitiously 
promotes the further integration of 
Europe, and consequently, promotes less 
sovereignty for the Member States." 21 
20. 
 
Sovereignty to the state 
The state (re)gains its sovereignty 
from the EU. This is perceived 
positively.  
"Every state has the freedom to decide for 
itself on how it wishes to pursue its 
foreign policy. 61 
21. 
 
Democracy (positive) 
Indicates either that (1) 
democracy/democratic principles 
are perceived positively, or (2) that 
democracy will be (re)gained. 
"I believe in democracy and transparency, 
and therefore I believe that my vote on 
this matter should have been a matter of 
public record." 14 
22. 
 
Democracy (negative) 
Indicates either that (1) 
democracy/democratic principles 
are perceived negatively, or (2) that 
there is a loss of democracy. 
"Say 'no' to this institution; say 'no' to this 
Union that disrespects your democracy." 16 
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23. 
 
Pre-Maastricht/Lisbon 
Refers to the Maastricht Treaty of 
1992 and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. 
Both are perceived negatively, and 
the radical right calls for a return to 
the situation before either of these 
treaties came into effect.  
"With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and 
especially its amendment in Lisbon in 
2007, the political elites have taken steps 
to permanently transfer the EU into a 
centralised state. 14 
24. 
 
Sanctions by the EU 
Any type of sanctions imposed by 
the EU against Russia are perceived 
negatively.  
"I believe that the already prompted and 
future sanctions against Russia are 
inappropriate and unfounded." 31 
25. 
International  
cooperation 
International cooperation between 
countries and/or between countries 
and institutes will be promoted as 
long as this does not come at the 
cost of losing sovereignty. If 
sovereignty is lost, this will be 
coded as Sovereignty to the EU. 
"We must also secure Polish-Hungarian-
Croatian cooperation, conduct Eurasia-
oriented foreign policy and establish good 
relations with the Far East." 54 
26. 
 
Anti-U.S. 
The U.S. is (1) perceived negatively, 
or (2) perceived as one of the 
aggressors of the conflict. 
"Europe cannot simply serve the US or 
any other country's political interests." 57 
27. 
 
Anti-NATO 
NATO is (1) perceived negatively, 
or (2) as an aggressive actor.  
"This is based on a NATO report, an 
organisation whose objective it is to 
combat Russia." 23 
28. 
 
Pro-NATO 
NATO is (1) perceived positively, 
or (2) as an actor that can help 
resolve the Ukrainian crisis. 
"I believe that the military situation in the 
Black Sea should be a matter for NATO, 
not the European Union." 11 
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29. 
 
Defence by the state 
General references to the national 
defence system when defence 
alliances are perceived as 
undesirable. 
"The AfD reject the idea of a combined 
European military force, and subscribes 
to well-equipped and trained German 
Armed Forces as the pillar of German 
sovereignty." 15 
30. 
 
Defence alliances 
General references to defence 
alliances in a positive sense. Any 
statements specifically related to 
NATO are coded in accordance with 
Anti-NATO or Pro-NATO. 
"However, we will of course continue our 
close cooperation with our European 
partners on matters of defence and 
security once we have left the EU." 9 
31. 
Ukraine  
neutral 
Ukraine is perceived as a neutral 
actor. 
"Nevertheless, while Ukraine's borders 
may be inviolable, they are not 
unchangeable." 19 
32. 
 
Anti-Ukraine 
Ukraine is (1) perceived negatively, 
or (2) as the aggressor of the 
conflict. 
"The Ukrainians are not absolved of all 
blame for things that have happened there 
in the wake of the revolution, but all 
revolutions bring chaos, injustice and 
suffering." 30 
33. 
 
Pro-Ukraine 
Ukraine is (1) perceived positively, 
or (2) as the victim of EU or 
Russian aggression. 
"In Ukraine, we should support a federal 
constitution with a special status for the 
Eastern regions." 8 
34. 
 
Crimean/Ukrainian crisis 
Any mentions of the Ukrainian 
and/or Crimean crisis. Mentions of 
the Crimean annexation can also fall 
under this code. 
"The forced rapprochement of the EU has 
triggered chaos in Ukraine, and this has 
ended with the secession of Crimea." 20 
36. 
 
Association Agreement 
References to the Association 
Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova; 
coded when there is a negative 
connotation.  
"It has been, among others, the 
Association Agreement which has further 
fuelled an already heated political 
situation." 51 
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Appendix 2 
 
Raw information and codes on the AfD can be accessed from: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1v20Qz8DLMrcXxyJuIwe38iEVCpdLvaei 
Raw information and codes on the FN can be accessed from: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1DdhCZvYenItclhUfty0wMPOjkddiUGIC 
Raw information and codes on the FPÖ can be accessed from: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=13mFnJWWThRalmpevWMWwV5h8sOFaRlhx 
Raw information and codes on Jobbik can be accessed from: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1zbpy1Zaa9XWpkGBCxrkA71NTau-GrFFp 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Yadd5H12InLxUqblj49K6uqGKiQb0wG1 
Raw information and codes on UKIP can be accessed from:  
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1WtYyyz-QDXBzWCQoH1A_VPJNnBNbMh9T 
Raw information and codes on the VB can be accessed from:  
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1NzhJdZ3eRKCw3ZOQK3bb6BX8Pd5KCJdm 
Raw information and codes from the debates can be accessed from: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1cHad56gVE0-U1nO4P33ZogLzYLQrxVxd 
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B. Kappel FPÖ 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
G. Mayer FPÖ 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
F. Obermayr FPÖ 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
H. Vilimsky FPÖ 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
G. Annemans VB 3 1 3 2 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 3
B. Von Storch AfD 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 4 -99
H.O. Henkel AfD -88 -88 -88 -88 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
J. Starbatty AfD -88 -88 -88 -88 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 1
B. Lucke AfD -88 -88 -88 -88 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 1
B. Kölmel AfD -88 -88 -88 -88 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 1
U. Trebesius AfD -88 -88 -88 -88 3 2 3 2 2 1 5 -99
M. Pretzell AfD 1 2 4 -99 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
L. Aliot FN 4 -99 4 -99 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
E. Ferrand FN 4 -99 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
M. Le Pen FN 4 -99 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
G. Lebreton FN 4 -99 5 -99 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
F. Philippot FN 4 -99 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
M.C. Arnautu FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
N. Bay FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
D. Bilde FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
 M.C. Boutonnet FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
S. Briois FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
M. D'Ornano FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
S. Goddyn FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
J.F. Jalkh FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
P. Loiseau FN 3 1 4 -99 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
D. Martin FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
B. Monot FN 3 1 5 -99 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
S. Montel FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
J. Mélin FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3  
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Appendix 3 continued 
 J. Mélin FN 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
M. Troszczynski FN 3 1 4 -99 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
J.L. Schaffhauser FN 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
A. Chauprade FN -88 -88 -88 -88 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
J.P. Le Pen FN 6 -99 6 -99 4 -99 4 -99 1 3 1 3
B. Gollnisch FN 3 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
W. Dartmouth UKIP 4 -99 4 -99 4 -99 1 1 4 -99 4 -99
T. Aker UKIP 4 -99 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B. Etheridge UKIP 4 -99 2 1 5 -99 1 1 1 1 1 1
N. Farage UKIP 4 -99 4 -99 4 -99 1 1 1 1 4 -99
N. Gill UKIP 4 -99 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 -99
J.S. Agnew UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J. Arnott UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G. Batten UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 -99 1 1
J. Carver UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D. Coburn UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 -99 1 1
R. Finch UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 -99
R. Helmer UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M. Hookem UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 -99
P. O'Flynn UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M. Parker UKIP 3 1 2 1 6 -99 6 -99 1 1 1 1
J. Reid UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J. Seymour UKIP 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 -99
L. Bours UKIP 3 1 4 -99 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 -99
J. Collins UKIP 5 -99 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 -99
P. Nuttall UKIP 5 -99 4 -99 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 -99
D. James UKIP -88 -88 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J. Atkinson UKIP -88 -88 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A. Bashir UKIP -88 -88 -88 -88 -88 -88 -88 -88 1 1 1 1
K. Morvai Jobbik 4 -99 4 -99 1 3 1 3 1 3 4 -99
Z. Balszo Jobbik 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
B. Kovacs Jobbik 1 3 4 -99 1 3 1 3 5 -99 1 3  
Codes on the votes explained:  Codes on loyal/rebel explained: 
1. Against     1. Loyal 
2. In favour     2. Rebellious 
3. Abstained     3. Independent 
4. Absent     -99. MEP was absent or did not vote 
5. No vote -88. MEP was not affiliated with the 
6. Documented absence          parties under discussion. 
-88. MEP was not affiliated with the 
       parties under discussion.  
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